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  INTRODUCTION   
Resistance to the Trump Administration’s immigration en-
forcement policies in the form of sanctuary has increased and 
spread.1 Consider the following examples during President 
Trump’s first year in office. Immediately after he issued an ex-
ecutive order seeking to punish “sanctuary cities,”2 the city of 
San Francisco immediately filed a lawsuit challenging its consti-
tutionality.3 Other “sanctuary cities” reaffirmed their policies4 or 
codified their policies into law,5 and still others issued state-
ments and resolutions that did not adopt the “sanctuary” label 
yet provided protections for undocumented immigrants.6 Many 
religious leaders and communities opened their churches to shel-
ter undocumented immigrants who were facing removal orders 
from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).7 Indeed, 
churches offering “sanctuary” to immigrants who are subject to 
deportation jumped from 400 to 800.8 
 
 1. The term “sanctuary” has not been well-defined. We discuss in Part I, 
infra what we mean in this Article when we use the term “sanctuary.” See infra 
Part I. See also Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018), for a more detailed discussion of the current mean-
ing of “sanctuary cities.” 
 2. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 3. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, County of Santa 
Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-00485-
DMR), 2017 WL 412999. Santa Clara County similarly filed a complaint. Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Santa Clara, 275 F. Supp. 3d. 1196 
(No. 5:17-cv-00574). 
 4. See, e.g., Chi. City Council Res. SR2017-44 (Ill. 2017), https://chicago 
.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2945212&GUID=69A303F3-95FD-
4581-8FC3-8D09910F82A7&Options=Advanced&Search=&FullText=1; Peter 
Hegarty, Alameda: City Leaders Reaffirm Commitment to Sanctuary Policy, E. 
BAY TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/01/26/alameda 
-city-leaders-reaffirm-commitment-to-sanctuary-policy.  
 5. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 1, § 10-178 (2017), 
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3022098&GUID= 
D0BFA473-FA7C-4FA6-83C4-216E9706EE7A. 
 6. Christopher Yee, Like El Monte, Monterey Park Adopts Rules Without 
‘Sanctuary City’ Name, PASADENA STAR NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www 
.pasadenastarnews.com/2017/02/16/like-el-monte-monterey-park-adopts-rules 
-without-sanctuary-city-name (noting that the resolution initially proposed to 
declare Monterey Park a “sanctuary city,” but when it passed, the resolution 
instead announced that the city would be “dedicated to preserving the rights of 
all persons within its jurisdiction”). 
 7. Gabriella Borter, More Churches Are Offering Sanctuary for Immi-
grants Under Trump, HUFFPOST (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/entry/trump-sanctuary-churches_us_5980e03ce4b09d24e993a167. 
 8. Id. 
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Notably, new forms of sanctuary also emerged. In different 
parts of the country, immigrants’ rights advocates formed “rapid 
response networks” that seek to, among other things, enable 
U.S. citizens to show up at homes and businesses during ICE 
raids to bear witness, document events, and get information 
about where the immigrant will be detained.9 Some individuals 
turned to social media to warn immigrants about potential ICE 
raids in certain neighborhoods.10 In Austin, Texas, community 
members set up a “Sanctuary in the Streets Initiative,” in which 
a U.S. citizen would serve as a “physical barrier” between ICE 
agents and an undocumented immigrant whose property is 
about to be raided.11 Several universities declared themselves 
“sanctuary campuses”12 or issued policies that aim to protect 
their undocumented students.13 Employers and large companies 
too have joined the resistance. Restaurant owners, for example, 
have refused to allow ICE agents to enter their restaurants with-
out a warrant.14 Microsoft announced that it would challenge the 
removal of any of its employees who have Deferred Action for 
 
 9. See, e.g., Kate Morrissey, Organized Resistance Is Forming to Trump’s 
Immigration Crackdown, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www 
.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/sd-me-deportation-resistance 
-20170301-story.html; NYC #ResistTrump Rapid Response Team, ACTION NET-
WORK, https://actionnetwork.org/forms/nyc-resisttrump-rapid-response-team 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018); Rapid Response Network, OAKLAND COMMUNITY 
ORG., http://www.oaklandcommunity.org/rapid-response-network (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2018). 
 10. Patrick Howell O’ Neill, ‘Raid Alerts’ Wants to Warn Undocumented Im-
migrants with an App, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 18, 2017), https://motherboard 
.vice.com/en_us/article/xy7yzn/raid-alerts-wants-to-warn-undocumented 
-immigrants-with-an-app. It should be noted, however, that many have criti-
cized the use of social media platforms such as Facebook to post warnings about 
immigration authorities, contending that doing so stokes fear in certain neigh-
borhoods. See, e.g., False Stories About ICE Sweeps & Checkpoints Spark Fear 
in New York’s Immigrant Communities, CBS N.Y. (Feb. 23, 2017), http:// 
newyork.cbslocal.com/2017/02/23/bogus-ice-reports. 
 11. See Tom Dart, How Immigration Activists Prepare to Fight Deportations 
Under Donald Trump, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2017/jan/15/donald-trump-deportation-us-immigration-texas. 
 12. See Kathleen Megan, Wesleyan Declares Itself a Sanctuary Campus for 
Undocumented Immigrants, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www 
.courant.com/education/hc-college--trump-sanctuary-1123-20161122-story 
.html. 
 13. Julia Preston, Campuses Wary of Offering ‘Sanctuary’ to Undocumented 
Students, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/ 
education/edlife/sanctuary-for-undocumented-students.html. 
 14. Jessica Haynes, Ann Arbor Restaurant Refused Kitchen Entry to ICE 
Agents, Owner Says, MLIVE (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.mlive.com/business/ 
ann-arbor/index.ssf/2017/08/ann_arbor_restaurant_refused_k.html. 
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Childhood Arrivals (DACA) from being removed from the coun-
try.15 Airbnb proclaimed that it would provide free housing to 
refugees who were banned or displaced as a result of the travel 
ban.16 
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, from self-declared 
sanctuary campuses to #resistICE17 to workplace sanctuary, 
novel forms of sanctuary have surfaced. Despite the growth and 
development of new and expanded forms of sanctuary, discus-
sion of the term “sanctuary” remains obsessed with state and lo-
cal rights.18 When the term is invoked by a city or state,19 or de-
rided by the current administration,20 they refer to 
governmental entities and agencies declining to participate in 
 
 15. Todd Haselton, Microsoft to Trump: You’re Going to Have to Go Through 
Us to Deport Dreamers Who Work Here, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.cnbc 
.com/2017/09/05/microsoft-response-to-daca-will-defend-dreamers-in-court 
.html. 
 16. Amy B. Wang, Airbnb Offers Free Housing to Refugees and Others in 
Limbo After Trump’s Executive Order, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/01/29/airbnb-offers-free 
-housing-to-refugees-and-others-in-limbo-after-trumps-executive-order/ 
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a45faeadef2f.  
 17. Compiling Twitter Posts Using the Hashtag “resistICE,” TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/hashtag/resistice (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 18. See, e.g., Erin Mower Adams, Noncitizen Youth in the Juvenile Justice 
System: The Serious Consequences of Failed Confidentiality by ICE Referral, 
2017 BYU L. REV. 385, 408–09 (2017) (discussing how sanctuary jurisdictions’ 
juvenile detention policies clash with federal detention policies); see also, e.g., 
County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Exec. 
Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). See generally Kari Hong, 
The Costs of Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement Measures, 2017 CARDOZO 
L. REV. DE NOVO 119 (2017) (discussing the effects of the Trump Administra-
tion’s immigration enforcement policies on state and local jurisdictions); Chris-
tine Kwon & Marissa Roy, Local Action, National Impact: Standing Up for 
Sanctuary Cities, 127 YALE L.J.F. 715 (2018) (arguing that cities and local ju-
risdictions can be strong actors to resist the Trump Administration’s immigra-
tion policies); Lasch et al., supra note 1 (discussing tension between local sanc-
tuary policies and Trump Administration’s order to withhold funds from state 
and local jurisdictions). 
 19. Bradley Zint, Glendale Police Vow Not to Enforce Federal Immigration 
Laws, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me 
-glendale-police-20170401-story.html (announcing the Glendale City Council’s 
resolution affirming police officers will “not enforce federal immigration laws”). 
 20. Elise Foley & Marina Fang, White House, Trump Attack Judicial 
Branch Again by Misconstruing ‘Sanctuary City’ Ruling, HUFFPOST (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-attacks-court-immigration 
-sanctuary-cities_us_590098e7e4b0af6d718a2d99 (criticizing sanctuaries as 
“cities . . . engaged in the dangerous and unlawful nullification of Federal law 
in an attempt to erase our borders”). 
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federal immigration enforcement.21 The legal battle over sanctu-
aries thus continues to be framed as a federalism contest, with 
the Tenth Amendment shielding state and local authorities from 
conscription into federal enforcement efforts.22 This justification 
depends heavily on the right of states to control their own affairs 
as independent, constitutional actors who maintain authority 
over community safety and residential policing.23 
To be clear, similar to other legal scholars, we too have ex-
amined sanctuary along federalism grounds.24 Tenth Amend-
ment concerns remain a critical issue in the legal debate about 
the validity of sanctuary cities. Yet, focusing only on sovereignty 
and federalism issues is myopic. It elides the multiple ways that 
public and private actors have offered sanctuary today, exerting 
governance and authority over noncitizens and competing with 
the federal government’s enforcement scheme. Further, in light 
of increased immigration enforcement that is certain to persist 
under the current administration, conventional and innovative 
forms of sanctuary are likely to continue. To fully appreciate the 
legal issues surrounding the provision of sanctuary today, we 
 
 21. Id.; Zint, supra note 19. 
 22. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal 
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or execu-
tive action, federal regulatory programs.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 157 (1992) (“[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Fed-
eral Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power 
to the States.”). 
 23. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and 
Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
247, 251 (2012) (arguing that local policy makers and law enforcement officials 
in sanctuary jurisdictions make “thoughtful and deliberate public safety deci-
sions, taking great pains to do the right thing for the entire community. Th[e]se 
decisions are critical to principles of inclusion in our ever-growing diverse com-
munities”). 
 24. We ourselves have in the past focused our legal and policy analysis on 
sanctuary along federalism principles. See, e.g., PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & 
S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015) (pos-
iting “that immigration federalism is rooted in a political process that connects 
federal and subfederal actors”); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villa-
zor, Sanctuary Policies and Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 
WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2009) (exploring “doctrinal and theoretical chal-
lenges confronting San Francisco’s non-cooperation ordinance, and similar sub-
federal issues”); Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary” Cities and Local Citizenship, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 576 (2010) (exploring how “sanctuary laws illustrate 
the tension between national and local citizenship”). Our point in this Article is 
to suggest that legal analysis of sanctuary actions today should be broader and 
not limited to the Tenth Amendment framework in light of the multiple, inter-
related and overlapping legal issues that have thus far been ignored in legal 
scholarship. 
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need to move beyond federalism analysis and explore the ways 
that the sanctuary movement and actions have evolved into a 
distributed network of public and private actors. 
This Article is the first to comprehensively describe and the-
orize the innovative and expanded forms of sanctuary today.25 
Adopting network governance theories developed by political 
theorists and sociologists,26 this Article introduces a new frame-
work27 that we coin “sanctuary networks” to argue that current 
public and private sanctuaries are best understood as part of a 
broader system of legal resistance to the federal enforcement re-
gime. Ultimately, we contend that each type of sanctuary exam-
ined here has an independent, normative value and legal justifi-
cation, but the ability of each to protect undocumented 
immigrants is limited. Viewed in isolation, the ability of these 
sanctuaries to achieve their specific goals may be constrained by 
legal principles that govern public and private entities. Exam-
ined together, however, these public and private groups are 
forming a system that collaborates, formally in some contexts 
and informally in others, to collectively challenge the federal 
government’s claimed monopoly on setting immigration policy. 
Reframing sanctuary as part of a larger network forces a re-
thinking of governance in immigration law and policy. This novel 
form of legal resistance has several doctrinal, normative and pol-
icy implications for immigration law. First, on a doctrinal level, 
 
 25. This Article focuses primarily on the provision of sanctuary to immi-
grants. Although we explore “anti-sanctuary” in this Article where relevant, we 
provide a deeper analysis of such policies in a companion article, Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, State Anti-Sanctuary & Immi-
gration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 26. See R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY NET-
WORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1997); R.A.W. 
Rhodes, Policy Networks: A British Perspective, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 293 
(1990) (discussing problems with policy networks, British contributions, and fu-
ture lines of development); see also infra Part III (discussing network analysis 
and applying it to sanctuary policies). 
 27. Reliance on social science disciplines, including political science and so-
ciology, has long been used in legal scholarship to develop frameworks that offer 
in-depth and robust descriptive, normative, and prescriptive explanations of the 
development of law. See, e.g., Robert M. Hayden, Social Theory and Legal Prac-
tice: Intuition, Discourse, and Legal Scholarship, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 461 (1989) 
(discussing the use of social science in legal scholarship); Richard A. Posner, The 
Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113 (1981) (arguing that 
doctrinal analysis, rather than positive analysis of the law through social sci-
ences, should remain the core of legal scholarship); Edward L. Rubin, The New 
Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) (discussing the value of a new synthesis of dis-
course for legal scholarship which incorporates ideas from different fields). 
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the anti-commandeering and state sovereignty variants of feder-
alism cease to be the sole point of legal discourse. Instead, net-
work analysis allows for focus on the statutory interconnected-
ness and practical relationships among various institutions, 
agencies and actors. In other words, borrowing from Dean 
Heather Gerken, one of the nation’s leading experts on progres-
sive federalism theories, our framework examines “federalism 
all the way down” by exploring the interactions among other ac-
tors that participate in government and policymaking28 and, in 
so doing, reveals the strengths and limits of legal justifications 
animating traditional and new forms of sanctuary. We show that 
the legal discourse on sanctuary networks relies on several un-
derappreciated doctrinal sources other than the Tenth Amend-
ment, including the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, 
property law, privacy law, and religious freedom laws.29 
Second, viewing sanctuary through this new theoretical lens 
reveals the broader normative goals of various public and private 
actors seeking to help undocumented immigrants and their fam-
ilies. By enacting or articulating “laws,” “policies,” “standards,” 
or “mission statements,” these public and private sanctuaries 
are not just using their authority to reject federal immigration 
policy. They are also instantiating an alternative paradigm that 
competes with the federal government’s vision of how undocu-
mented immigrants ought to be treated.30 As immigration legal 
scholar Hiroshi Motomura notes, the norm in these areas of over-
lapping sanctuaries is that unlawful status shapes the beginning 
of the conversation about appropriate enforcement responses, in-
stead of ending it.31 By actually implementing a sanctuary pol-
icy—by “dissenting by deciding” in Gerken’s formulation32—
these multiple points of sanctuary allow their specific constitu-
encies, as well as broader local, state, and national ones, to weigh 
competing conceptions of rule of law, moral legitimacy, public 
 
 28. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010). 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See, for example, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993), for a dis-
cussion of norm-creating power. 
 31. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 21 (2014). 
 32. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 
1747–51 (2005) (“Dissenting by deciding occurs when would-be dissenters—in-
dividuals who hold a minority view within the polity as a whole—enjoy a local 
majority on a decisionmaking body and can thus dictate the outcome.”); see also 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1293–94 (2009) (“The opportunity to dissent by deciding gives 
uncooperative federalism an advantage over the political safeguards model.”). 
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safety outcomes, and social justice embodied by the administra-
tion’s approach that contrast with the sanctuaries’ approach. 
Finally, we argue that these multi-faceted sanctuaries are 
all participating in calibrating national immigration policy. 
Those invested in immigration law and policy, particularly on 
the federal level, but as well as state and local level, must ac-
count for these various points of resistance, by either accommo-
dating them or expending political capital to overcome them. As 
such, recognizing the emergent sanctuary networks provides a 
broader and more accurate rendering of the costs of a hyper en-
forcement-minded federal regime. Ultimately, these decentral-
ized inputs will dynamically influence and alter federal and 
state level lawmaking on immigration. In short, we show how 
the adoption of the “sanctuary” label or implementing immi-
grant-protective policies have enabled these public and private 
entities to transform themselves into important legal and politi-
cal actors, leveraging the real power they possess as nodes of 
governance over immigration enforcement. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets the stage by 
explaining what we mean in this Article when we use the term 
“sanctuary.” As we emphasize, although there is no consistent 
meaning of the term “sanctuary,” we deploy a definition that fo-
cuses on public and private efforts that range from disentangling 
local institutions from participating in immigration enforcement 
to those that shield against federal enforcement tactics. Using 
this broad working definition of sanctuary, Part II maps out the 
different categories of sanctuary that exist today. Here, we de-
scribe each type of sanctuary, detailing the scope of protection 
each might provide an undocumented immigrant. In addition, 
we discuss and assess the legal justification for each to analyze 
their strengths and weaknesses and examine common legal chal-
lenges that they have encountered. 
Part III examines the different types of sanctuary in relation 
to each other. Using network analysis as a theoretical frame, we 
demonstrate that the legal potency of any type of sanctuary de-
pends on contextual and relational factors. Even in traditional 
and long-standing sanctuary cities, emerging forms of local and 
private sanctuary are necessary compliments to help actualize 
the full potential of a resistant, governance network. Moreover, 
even in a “dissenting” role, where a private or local sanctuary is 
located in a decidedly anti-sanctuary state, these local and hy-
per-local expressions remain critical sites of resistance and 
norm-creation. 
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Finally, Part IV explores the normative and policy implica-
tions of this decentralized framework for understanding sanctu-
aries and governance over immigration enforcement. We argue 
that this trend is a positive one that destabilizes the federal gov-
ernment’s monopoly over setting the enforcement regime, and 
allows for greater democratization in negotiating the terms of 
national immigration policy 
Ultimately, this project helps reorient our theoretical and 
legal approach to sanctuaries. By contextualizing and emphasiz-
ing other sanctuary providers alongside state and local govern-
ments, we carve out conceptual space for the myriad institutions 
and networks, whether private or public, that govern the lives of 
undocumented noncitizens. This reorientation is critical in a reg-
ulatory sphere characterized by complexity and interdependence 
between multiple levels of government and the institutions of 
everyday life, like workplaces, schools, and religious organiza-
tions. 
I.  DEFINING “SANCTUARY”   
There is no precise definition of the term “sanctuary.”33 In-
deed, no legal definition of “sanctuary” in the immigration law 
context exists, leaving its meaning contested among those who 
have a stake in immigration law enforcement and policy. Accord-
ingly, the term “sanctuary” is fraught with various legal, social 
and political tensions, and establishing a fixed definition is be-
yond the scope of this Article.34 For purposes of this Article, we 
offer a working definition that allows us to include the various 
public and private immigrant-friendly and protective actions, 
policies and practices that we map in Part II. In addition, it sets 
up our theoretical and normative discussions in Parts III and IV 
that demonstrate the underappreciated myriad of entities that 
participate in governing the lives of noncitizens, and by exten-
sion, calibrating national immigration policy. 
Here, we use the term “sanctuary” to refer to a range of pol-
icies and programs adopted by public and private entities or or-
 
 33. What Is a Sanctuary?, GOOGLE, http://google.com (search “What is a 
sanctuary?”) (revealing various articles after “What is a sanctuary?,” including 
“Sanctuary City” by Wikipedia and a Biblical definition of the term “sanctu-
ary”).  
 34. We do not wade into the debate on what sanctuary should be. We also 
do not seek to resolve whether the term “sanctuary” is an ideal or useful term 
for public and private individuals and groups to use. 
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ganizations that decline or limit voluntary participation in fed-
eral immigration enforcement practices or seek to shield noncit-
izens from federal enforcement efforts. We emphasize that the 
sanctuaries we include within this definition are all, in our view, 
acting within reasonable interpretations of current constitu-
tional principles and statutory law. That is, although these sanc-
tuaries might border on outright civil disobedience, we contend 
in Part II that they all rest on colorable legal justifications. 
Based on these criteria, we would include within our defini-
tion of sanctuary those public and private policies that have 
openly adopted the “sanctuary” label and have expressed that 
they would not cooperate with the federal government in enforc-
ing immigration law unless required to do so by law. But we also 
include those policies and actions that might not have the “sanc-
tuary” moniker but nevertheless have the effect of limiting in-
volvement with federal immigration enforcement or aim to es-
tablish a safe haven for immigrants.35 Our criteria are broad 
enough to encompass any number of efforts to resist federal en-
forcement efforts by public and private entities, and all the ways 
in which law enforcement agencies might disentangle them-
selves from federal immigration authorities. Especially for the 
latter, our definition contemplates entities that might justify 
their actions based on community-focused policing efforts or fis-
cal and manpower conservation, rather than on an expressly im-
migration-based agenda. 
So that readers have a sense of how our usage of the term 
comports with other legally or politically relevant definitions, we 
briefly explain the respective positions of the current admin-
istration and immigrant advocates on this definitional issue. 
Our usage of the term includes the various policies and institu-
tions identified by both the federal government and advocates. 
Unlike the federal government, however, we believe sanctuaries 
are acting within the bounds of statutory and constitutional law. 
And, unlike some advocates, we are not including institutions 
engaged in outright civil disobedience or defiance of applicable 
law without legal justification. 
The Trump Administration’s statements, executive orders, 
and litigation position suggest at least three definitions of the 
 
 35. Accordingly, for example, our use of sanctuary includes the City of Aus-
tin, Texas, which in 2014 declared itself a “Welcoming City” and affirmed its 
commitment to support the “long-term integration of immigrant communities.” 
Austin City Council Res. 20140320-049 (Tex. 2014), http://www.austintexas 
.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=207652. 
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term “sanctuary,” all of which are focused on law enforcement 
policies at the state and local level. The first is a general mean-
ing that can be gleaned from President Trump’s Executive Order 
(E.O.) 13,768.36 E.O. 13,768 aims to penalize sanctuary jurisdic-
tions by denying them federal funds.37 Stating that “sanctuary 
jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate Federal 
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United 
States,”38 the executive order claims that the actions of sanctu-
ary jurisdictions have “caused immeasurable harm” to the 
United States.39 Accordingly, E.O. 13,768 articulates that the 
policy of the federal government is to “[e]nsure that jurisdictions 
that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive 
Federal grants.”40 In particular, the executive order warns that, 
“jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 
[sic] (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal 
funds.”41 Thus, E.O. 13,768 strives to define “sanctuary jurisdic-
tions” in general terms as places that are harming the country 
through their defiance of 8 U.S.C. § 1373. This broad definition 
recalls the political rhetoric during the presidential campaign in 
which then candidate Trump criticized sanctuary cities such as 
San Francisco, which he claimed was responsible for the death 
of Kate Steinle, a woman who was killed by an undocumented 
immigrant.42 Thus, now as president, Trump demanded a 
 
 36. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 37. It should be noted that one of the legal issues presented in the litigation 
over Executive Order 13,768 is whether the President and the Executive Branch 
has the power to defund sanctuary jurisdictions. County of Santa Clara v. 
Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The federal government’s 
“power of the purse” resides in Congress’s Spending Power, not the Executive 
Branch. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1386–
92 (1988) (discussing Congress’s appropriation power and the limitations im-
posed on the Executive Branch’s spending authority). 
 38. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. As more fully explained in Part II, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 encourages fed-
eral, state, and local government entities to cooperate with federal immigration 
laws by prohibiting such entities from preventing their employees from volun-
tarily reporting an individual’s immigration status to immigration authorities. 
See infra Part II. 
 41. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
 42. Chris Nguyen, Kate Steinle’s Family Speaks After Mention by Donald 
Trump at RNC, ABC7 NEWS (July 22, 2016), https://abc7news.com/news/ 
exclusive-kate-steinles-family-speaks-after-mention-by-trump-at-rnc/1439363 
(asking “where was sanctuary for Kate Steinle?”). 
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“crackdown on sanctuary cities.”43 ICE authorities have called 
such cities “un-American” for “harboring criminal illegal immi-
grants.”44 
Ensuing litigation over the executive order, however, forced 
the administration to consider a more specific definition of sanc-
tuary jurisdiction. E.O. 13,768 gives Attorney General Jeff Ses-
sions power to determine which entities would be considered 
sanctuary jurisdictions.45 In a memo clarifying the scope of the 
executive order,46 Attorney General Sessions explained that the 
mandates of E.O. 13,768 refer only to those jurisdictions that re-
ceive grants from the Department of Justice (DOJ) or Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) through law enforcement pro-
grams to which the jurisdictions have applied.47 In other words, 
E.O. 13,768 applies only to those entities that were required, as 
a condition of receiving federal funds for their programs, to con-
firm that they are following or adhering to 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Fail-
ure to do so would render those entities “sanctuary jurisdic-
tions.” From a definitional point of view, the terms “sanctuary” 
and “sanctuary jurisdictions” are those states and cities that re-
ceive federal funds from DOJ or DHS and refused to comply with 
8 U.S.C. § 1373. It is, in other words, a narrower meaning of 
“sanctuary.” It is worth noting, however, that E.O. 13,768 does 
not define specifically what constitutes noncompliance with 8 
U.S.C. § 1373.48 (Indeed, as we discuss infra in Part II, the con-
stitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is itself legally contested.)49 
The federal administration’s third and most specific defini-
tion of sanctuary city refers to jurisdictions that do not honor 
civil detainer requests by ICE officials.50 ICE civil detainers are 
 
 43. Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Again Pressures Sanctuary Cities, 
CNN (July 25, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/trump-admin 
-sanctuary-cities/index.html. 
 44. Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities: Chicago, NYC, 
San Francisco, Philadelphia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc 
-san-francisco-philadelphia. 
 45. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
 46. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney Gen. to All Dep’t Grant-
Making Components (May 22, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/3728675/Implementation-of-Executive-Order-13768.pdf. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
 49. See infra Part II. 
 50. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510–11 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017) (discussing civil detainers). 
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requests that the federal government makes to state or local au-
thorities requesting that those officers hold a noncitizen in their 
custody.51 Upon learning that a local law enforcement agency 
has potentially removable noncitizens in custody, ICE officers 
might then request that the state or local entity hold the noncit-
izens in jail for up to forty-eight hours after their scheduled re-
lease from the local jail to give ICE time to determine whether 
or not to take the noncitizens into custody.52 The current admin-
istration considers entities that refuse to honor detainer re-
quests as sanctuary jurisdictions, and has identified them 
through the publication of lists of nonfederal jurisdictions that 
decline detainer requests.53 Among the jurisdictions that were 
included in the list were those that require the federal govern-
ment to obtain a warrant before they would agree to hold a 
noncitizen in custody after the noncitizen is required to be re-
leased under state or local law.54 
Similar to the two aforementioned definitions of “sanctu-
ary,” this third meaning also comes from a law enforcement per-
spective that descriptively and normatively adopts a top-down 
approach to immigration law enforcement. That is, all three pre-
sent conceptions of “sanctuary” and “sanctuary jurisdictions” as 
entities that violate laws and policies that are designed to en-
courage coordinated federal, state and local efforts in enforcing 
immigration law. We agree with the Trump Administration’s no-
tion that municipal and local law enforcement agency policies 
that limit notification, cooperation, and detention of noncitizens 
are sanctuaries, but disagree with the DOJ’s position that such 
policies violate any federal laws. 
Unsurprisingly, the definition and meaning of sanctuary of-
fered by immigrant advocates contrasts with the federal admin-
istration’s. Advocates adopt the term, but praise it for its positive 
connotations. For some advocates, “sanctuary cities” are those 
 
 51. Immigration Detainers: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 21, 
2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration 
-detainers-overview. 
 52. Id. 
 53. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF ’T, ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL 
OPERATIONS: WEEKLY DECLINED DETAINER OUTCOME REPORT FOR RECORDED 
DECLINED DETAINERS FEB 4–FEB 10, 2017, at 1 (2017), https://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/ddor/ddor2017_02-04to02-10.pdf.  
 54. See id. at 8–23 (listing policies from jurisdictions ranging from local en-
tities and cities to counties and states). 
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cities that provide a “safe harbor for undocumented immi-
grants,”55 “actions that make cities safer” because local law en-
forcement officers have the trust of the community,56 and cities 
that are a “safe haven for immigrants” or offer a “protective 
shield” that stand in the way of “federal efforts to pinpoint and 
deport people.”57 Importantly, they ascribe these characteristics 
to the same set of policies identified and targeted by the federal 
administration; namely, those that limit communication and 
participation with federal immigration officials, or that decline 
detainer requests. 
Immigrant advocates, however, have been willing to more 
liberally ascribe the term sanctuary to a broader set of institu-
tions beyond state and local governments or law enforcement 
agencies. Thus, they have described the provision of sanctuary 
in the context of churches, mosques, and synagogues that “pro-
vided space for people who are in fear of being deported”58 or a 
“home” to those who are about to be removed.59 Universities too 
have declared themselves as “sanctuary campuses” and ex-
pressed their support for undocumented students, particularly 
those who are recipients of the DACA60 program and their fami-
lies.61 Others have used the “sanctuary framework” to encourage 
 
 55. What Is a Sanctuary City? And What Happens Now?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 
25, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-a-sanctuary-city-and-what 
-happens-now. 
 56. Gabe Ortiz, What Is a ‘Sanctuary City’ Exactly? An Immigrant Rights 
Group Explains, DAILY KOS (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/ 
2017/4/28/1657149/-What-is-a-sanctuary-city-exactly-An-immigrant-rights 
-group-explains. 
 57. Amanda Sakuma & Jérôme Sessini, No Safe Place, MSNBC, http:// 
www.msnbc.com/specials/migrant-crisis/sanctuary-cities (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
 58. Doug Stewart, What Is a Sanctuary Church and Is It Legal?, FOX 61 
(July 21, 2017), http://fox61.com/2017/07/20/what-is-a-sanctuary-church-and-is 
-it-legal. 
 59. Churches Offer Sanctuary to Immigrants Who Could Face Deportation, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump 
-undocumented-immigrants-deportation-churches-sanctuary; Sigal Samuel, 
Mosques Want to Offer Sanctuary, but Will Anyone Accept?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/mosques-want-to 
-provide-sanctuary-but-will-anyone-accept-the-offer/516366.  
 60. See Preston, supra note 13. 
 61. Rosanna Xia, What Does It Mean to Be a ‘Sanctuary Campus?’ Two Col-
lege Presidents Weigh In, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/ 
local/education/la-essential-education-updates-southern-pitzer-panel 
-sanctuary-campus-1490381837-htmlstory.html.  
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employers to not discriminate or retaliate against their employ-
ees based on their employees’ immigration status.62 
The political and legal posturing against sanctuary has led 
to an ongoing and robust debate amongst advocates about 
whether the term helps or harms the goals of those who are in-
terested in supporting immigrants. Some cities and universities 
have a positive conception of the term, openly adopting its use to 
mean the provision of a safe haven for undocumented immi-
grants.63 Wesleyan University, for example, within a few weeks 
after the November 2016 election, declared itself a “sanctuary 
campus.”64 Others have shown less support for the use of the 
term and have chosen to not use the word at all or employed a 
different word.65 For instance, the City of Chicago, Illinois 
adopted a “Welcoming City Ordinance,” which prohibits agencies 
from inquiring and releasing information about a person’s immi-
gration status.66 This “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is similar to 
the policies of other cities, such as San Francisco’s, that openly 
calls its ordinance a “sanctuary ordinance.”67 In short, even 
 
 62. David Bacon, Fighting for the Sanctuary Workplace, U.S. SOLIDARITY 
ECON. NETWORK (June 27, 2017), https://ussen.org/2017/06/27/fighting-for-the 
-sanctuary-workplace.  
 63. E.g., Portland City Council Res. 37,277 (Or. 2017), http://efiles 
.portlandoregon.gov/Record/10774926 (declaring “the City of Portland a Wel-
coming City, Sanctuary City, and an Inclusive City for all”); City Coll. of S.F. 
Res. 161215-IX-346 (Cal. 2016), http://www.ccsf.edu/BOT/2016/December/346r 
.pdf (“City College of San Francisco joins the City and County of San Francisco 
in affirming its sanctuary status for all people of San Francisco.”); see also Mi-
chael S. Roth, Wesleyan University a Sanctuary Campus, WESLEYAN U. (Nov. 
20, 2016), http://roth.blogs.wesleyan.edu/2016/11/20/wesleyan-university-a 
-sanctuary-campus (declaring Wesleyan University a sanctuary campus). 
 64. See Roth, supra note 63; see also Chris Lydgate, Kroger Declares Reed 
a Sanctuary College, REED MAG. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.reed.edu/ 
reed_magazine/sallyportal/posts/2016/sanctuary-college.html (declaring Reed 
College a sanctuary college); Wim Wiewel, Portland State Is a Sanctuary City, 
PORTLAND ST. U., https://www.pdx.edu/insidepsu/portland-state-is-a-sanctuary 
-university (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (declaring Portland State University a 
sanctuary campus). 
 65. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 13 (noting that Janet Napolitano, Presi-
dent of the University of California, does not mention the word “sanctuary” 
when describing what the school system could offer its DACA students if Donald 
Trump cancelled the program because “[s]anctuary is such a vague term”). 
 66. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173 (2012), https://www.cityofchicago.org/ 
content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Office%20of%20New%20Americans/PDFs/ 
WelcomeCityOrdinance.pdf (adopting a “Welcoming City Ordinance” prohibit-
ing agencies from requesting and disclosing immigration statuses unless re-
quired by law). 
 67. Sanctuary City Ordinance, OFF. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT & IMMIGR. AFF., 
http://sfgov.org/oceia/sanctuary-city-ordinance-0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); see 
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amongst advocates, some believe the term should not apply out-
side the religious context, others believe it promises too much to 
undocumented persons, and still others find it instrumentally 
and politically disadvantageous. We note the existence of these 
important debates, but cabin those questions for our purposes 
here. For this Article, we adopt the term because of its consistent 
use in popular discourse and its ability to evoke—for detractors 
and supporters—ideas and questions about the appropriate level 
of federal immigration enforcement. 
As with the federal government’s definition, our criterion for 
this Article contemplates all the ways in which the advocates 
have also chosen to define sanctuary, including the myriad of 
public and private institutions and organizations that might be 
described as sanctuaries. As we will show in Part II, however, 
our conception might encompass community movements and 
employer policies that have not yet been specifically considered 
by enforcement officials or advocates as falling under the sanc-
tuary rubric. We note further that our use of the term “sanctu-
ary” does not necessarily suggest a highly protective policy. How-
ever, using the term might have psychological benefits for 
certain constituencies who believe it to have talismanic power.68 
Finally, it is equally important for us to specify what we do 
not mean as sanctuary. As we noted, we do not here include those 
institutions or entities engaged in outright defiance of the law 
with no apparent legal justification. In addition, we made the 
deliberate choice of disregarding those jurisdictions that have 
conferred rights to undocumented immigrants that are conven-
tionally given only to U.S. citizens or authorized immigrants. 
Such rights might include the right to vote in local school board 
elections,69 the right to obtain a driver’s license,70 the right to 
 
also S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12H.1–.6 (2016) (declaring the city a “City and 
County of Refuge”). 
 68. See Omar Martinez et al., Evaluating the Impact of Immigration Poli-
cies on Health Status Among Undocumented Immigrants: A Systematic Review, 
17 J. IMMIGR. MINOR HEALTH 947, 965 (2015) (examining the mental health 
impact of being undocumented and residing in immigrant friendly jurisdictions 
versus those places that express anti-immigrant sentiments). 
 69. S.F., CAL., CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.111 (2017). 
 70. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.9 (West 2017) (permitting an undoc-
umented resident to obtain a driver’s license with proof of identity in Califor-
nia); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-104.5 (2017) (requiring proof of residency in Ha-
waii); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-105.1 (2017) (requiring proof of residency for at 
least one year in Illinois). 
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obtain in-state tuition,71 or the right to work (such as a lawyer).72 
Further, we excluded those jurisdictions that confer municipal 
ID cards73 and library cards74 to their residents regardless of im-
migration status. These policies may arguably be described as 
broader examples of sanctuaries, and as a practical matter, ju-
risdictions with such policies are likely also to maintain one or 
more of the sanctuary policies that would meet our definition. 
However, we see such efforts as more about “rights-building” as 
opposed to those actions that are intended to or have the effect 
of defying or not cooperating with federal immigration enforce-
ment. In comparison to “rights-building,” our definition of sanc-
tuary includes those policies, which express opposition, or other-
wise undermine, the enforcement regime and policy vision 
instantiated by the federal executive department. 
II.  SANCTUARY EVERYWHERE   
To say that the election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presi-
dency has had a significant impact on immigrants and immigra-
tion policy would be an understatement. Within days of his pres-
idency, Donald Trump issued three executive orders that 
 
 71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 135A.043 (2017) (requiring three years of in-
state high school education and graduation, registration with the selective ser-
vice system, and a demonstration that the student has begun to seek docu-
mented status, if available to the student, for in-state college tuition in Minne-
sota); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:62-4 (West 2017) (creating a presumption that a 
person who has resided in the state for at least twelve months is eligible for 
resident tuition in New Jersey); OR. REV. STAT. § 352.287 (2017) (containing 
different requirements depending on where the student completed high school 
education and requiring a demonstration of intent to seek lawful status in Ore-
gon). 
 72. See, e.g., In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (granting undocumented 
applicant admission to State Bar); In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 597 (App. Div. 
2015) (“[U]ndocumented immigrants who have been granted DACA re-
lief . . . may be admitted to the practice of law provided that they other-
wise . . . meet the standards for admission . . . .”). 
 73. E.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, sec. 1, ch. 1, sub-ch. 1,  
§ 3-115(d)(1)(vi) (2018) (permitting foreign nationals to obtain city identification 
card with proof of identity in New York City, which can be in the form of a photo 
identification card issued by another country); S.F., CAL., ADMIN CODE ch. 95, 
§ 95.2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2017). 
 74. E.g., Stephanie M. Gomes, Building TRUST in Our Communities: 
States Encourage Their Residents to Speak Up in the Wake of the Federal Gov-
ernment’s Silence, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 715, 735–38 (2015) (describing how 
the city of New Haven, Connecticut permits undocumented residents to obtain 
a city-issued identification card that can be used at city libraries and parks, and 
can be used as a debit card). 
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implemented his campaign promises regarding immigrants,75 
including banning Muslims from entering the United States,76 
defunding sanctuary cities,77 building a wall between the United 
States and Mexico,78 and removing undocumented immigrants.79 
Since Donald Trump became president, arrests of immigrants, 
including those who have not committed any crimes, have in-
creased.80 His administration eliminated all removal priorities,81 
including those that centered on noncitizens with criminal his-
tories that were issued under the Obama Administration.82 In 
 
 75. See Aidan Quigley, All of Trump’s Major Executive Actions so Far, PO-
LITICO (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/01/all-trump 
-executive-actions-000288 (reporting on all of President Trump’s executive or-
ders from January 20, 2017 through April 27, 2017, including those that most 
impact immigrants: Executive Orders (E.O.) 13,767, 13,768, and 13,780). 
 76. See Greg Sargent, Opinion, Is This a ‘Muslim Ban’? Look at the History 
– and at Trump’s Own Words, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/01/31/is-this-a-muslim-ban 
-look-at-the-history-and-at-trumps-own-words/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.134f19dca04c (responding to President Trump’s E.O. 13,769 and quoting his 
2015 campaign call for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States”). 
 77. See Erin Durkin, Here’s How Trump’s Plan to Defund Sanctuary Cities 
Could Play Out, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.nydailynews 
.com/news/politics/trump-plan-defund-sanctuary-cities-play-article-1.2885423 
(quoting President Trump’s statement on sanctuary cities: “Cities that refuse to 
cooperate with federal authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars”). 
 78. Fred Imbert, Donald Trump: Mexico Going to Pay for Wall, CNBC (Oct. 
28, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/28/donald-trump-mexico-going-to-pay 
-for-wall.html (“We’re going to do a wall . . . . Mexico’s going to pay for [it] . . . .”). 
 79. Alexandra Jaffe, Donald Trump: Undocumented Immigrants ‘Have to 
Go’, NBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/ 
donald-trump-undocumented-immigrants-have-go-n410501 (“They have to go. 
[W]e either have a country, or we don’t have a country.”). 
 80. See Maria Sacchetti, ICE Immigration Arrests of Noncriminals Double 
Under Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/immigration-arrests-of-noncriminals-double-under-trump/2017/04/16/ 
98a2f1e2-2096-11e7-be2a-3a1fb24d4671_story.html?utm_term=.41fe23c6ee1a 
(reporting that immigration arrests have gone up 32.6% in the first weeks of the 
Trump Administration). 
 81. Anna O. Law, This Is How Trump’s Deportations Differ from Obama’s, 
WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey 
-cage/wp/2017/05/03/this-is-how-trumps-deportations-differ-from-obamas/ 
?utm_term=.211bd6340b51. 
 82. See Muzaffar Chishti et al., The Obama Record on Deportations: De-
porter in Chief or Not?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www 
.migrationpolicy.org/article/obama-record-deportations-deporter-chief-or-not 
(noting that the Department of Homeland Security’s immigration priority revi-
sions made noncitizens with criminal records a top enforcement target). 
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September 2017, President Trump rescinded the DACA pro-
gram, which benefitted 800,000 “Dreamers.”83 Further, ICE had 
been making arrests in places that it previously did not tradi-
tionally arrest immigrants, including courthouses84 and hospi-
tals.85 ICE has also been targeting undocumented parents of im-
migrants and U.S. citizen children.86 Through these various 
actions and policies, the current administration appears to be ef-
fectuating Trump’s promise to remove “probably 2 million” or 
more undocumented immigrants once he is in office.87 
Immigrant advocates have reacted to the heightened en-
forcement of immigration law in various ways designed to resist 
such policies. Chief among these has been to push for the adop-
tion or expansion of sanctuary policies. As we discuss below, the 
number of cities that became sanctuary cities or reiterated their 
sanctuary policies has increased. And, other traditional and his-
torical sources of religious sanctuary have announced their 
places of worship as sanctuaries. Notably, however, new forms 
of sanctuaries have also emerged. 
In this Part, we discuss these multiple types of sanctuaries. 
We detail the different categories of sanctuary, beginning with 
the more conventional types—churches and cities—and discuss 
how they have expanded and then analyze new types of sanctu-
ary that have emerged in more recent memory. In our discussion, 
we point out and assess the types of protection that each sanctu-
ary is able to provide to undocumented immigrants. These types 
may include “welcoming” measures (such as the designation of a 
site as “inclusive”), “non-immigration law enforcement” policies 
 
 83. Rachel Martin, Trump Rescinds DACA, Calls on Congress to Replace It, 
NPR (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/06/548819221/trump 
-administration-rescinds-daca-calls-on-congress-to-replace-it. 
 84. James Queally, ICE Agents Make Arrests at Courthouses, Sparking 
Backlash from Attorneys and State Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ice-courthouse-arrests-20170315 
-story.html. 
 85. Barbara Demick, Federal Agents in Texas Move Hospitalized Salva-
doran Woman Awaiting Emergency Surgery to a Detention Facility, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hospital-seizure 
-20170223-story.html. 
 86. Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Targets Parents in New Im-
migration Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/07/01/us/trump-arrest-undocumented-immigrants.html. 
 87. Bill Chappel, Donald Trump Says He’ll Deport 2–3 Million People Once 
in Office, NPR (Nov. 13, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/ 
11/13/501921177/donald-trump-says-hell-deport-2-3-million-people-once-in 
-office. 
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(i.e., refusing to use resources, public or private, to enforce im-
migration law), “don’t ask” policies (such as refusing to inquire 
about a person’s immigration status or participating in E-verify), 
“don’t tell” policies (i.e., refusing to disclose known information), 
humanitarian acts (such as the provision of shelter and food), 
private property rights assertions (such as refusing entry to law 
enforcement officers without an administrative or judicial war-
rant), and “forewarning” actions (such as notifying undocu-
mented immigrants about a raid). As we explain, the various cat-
egories of sanctuary have adopted one or more of each of these 
types of protective measures. 
Crucially, each sanctuary’s ability to provide a safe haven is 
contingent on legal boundaries. Each of them has independent 
legal grounds for supporting and providing assistance to immi-
grants. These multiple legal sources demonstrate the need to go 
beyond a Tenth Amendment analysis because contemporary 
sanctuary involves more complex and varied concerns than just 
structural power allocations between federal and state govern-
ments. The key, as we discuss in Parts III and IV, is how these 
traditional and emerging sanctuaries perform collectively and in 
relation to one another. 
A. CHURCH SANCTUARIES 
Arguably the most established understanding of the term 
“sanctuary” is its affiliation with a religious organization. That 
perhaps should be unexpected given that the oldest usage of the 
term appears in the Bible.88 As used there, it refers to “cities of 
refuge, of asylum” that existed “for the narrow purpose of provid-
ing a mechanism for the adjudication of claims of involuntary 
manslaughter.”89 In the United States, the contemporary use of 
a religious entity’s use of the term “sanctuary” originated in the 
1980s and shares similar goals of providing refuge to individuals 
who were seeking a safe haven.90 Escaping civil war, killings, 
 
 88. Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a 
Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 747, 749 (1986) (noting the concept of sanctuary is rooted in the Bible 
and developed in the Greco-Roman societies before being adopted in Anglo-
Saxon culture). 
 89. LaCroix v. Junior, Nos. F17–376, F17–1770, 2017 WL 837477, at *2 
n.3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017). 
 90. To be clear, in the United States, individuals and groups have offered 
sanctuary to various groups historically, including slaves in the Nineteenth cen-
tury, Jews seeking to escape the Holocaust, civil rights advocates who sought 
protection from mob violence in the 1950s and 1960s, and those who resisted 
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and both social and civil unrest, an estimated one million indi-
viduals from El Salvador and Guatemala entered the United 
States between 1981 and 1990.91 The federal government, how-
ever, routinely denied their asylum applications, stating that 
they were “economic migrants” and not eligible for political asy-
lum.92 Accordingly, the federal government processed them for 
deportation.93 
Believing that the asylum applicants would be killed if they 
were sent back to their home countries, members of Christian 
churches and synagogues borrowed the biblical concept of “sanc-
tuary”94 and began what became known as the Sanctuary Move-
ment.95 Located at different parts of the country, there were an 
estimated 20,000 to 30,000 church members and more than 100 
churches and synagogues that joined the movement.96 Through 
this collective movement, members provided a range of assis-
tance and protection including shelter, clothing and other forms 
of support, such as legal services.97 Other members also assisted 
Central Americans to enter the United States and helped them 
avoid detection and deportation.98 
In seeking to provide safe havens to the Central American 
immigrants, the Sanctuary Movement had both moral and legal 
grounds. First, members of the movement believed that it was 
immoral and unconscionable to return the immigrants to their 
home countries.99 To them, sending the immigrants back to their 
 
the draft. Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133 
(2008). Other examples of sanctuary include universities welcoming Japanese 
Americans as students despite them having been subject to incarceration or in-
ternment under E.O. 9066. IMMIGRATION RESPONSE INITIATIVE, HARVARD LAW 
SCH., SANCTUARY CAMPUS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 27 (2017), https:// 
today.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Sanctuary-Campus 
-Toolkit.pdf. 
 91. Villazor, supra note 90, at 139–40; Susan Gzesh, Central Americans 
and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4621#.WMLVTU1-vcs.  
 92. See Gzesh, supra note 91 (noting approval rates for Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan asylum cases was under three percent in 1984). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. (noting local congregations endorsed the concept and practice of 
sanctuary). 
 95. Kathleen L. Villarruel, The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary 
Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1429, 1433 (1987). 
 96. Villazor, supra note 90, at 141. 
 97. Villarruel, supra note 95, at 1433. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Pamela Begaj, Note, An Analysis of Historical and Legal Sanctuary and 
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home countries was tantamount to issuing the asylum appli-
cants death sentences.100 But their claims went beyond what 
they saw as their moral obligation. Members of the Sanctuary 
Movement also argued that their actions were lawful exercises 
of their religious beliefs.101 Grounding this argument on the First 
Amendment, the Sanctuary Movement members contended that 
their sanctuary work constituted their religious expressions.102 
That is, they believed that the First Amendment provided legal 
support for their humanitarian actions.103 
Although the federal government was at first dismissive of 
the Sanctuary Movement,104 it eventually prosecuted those in-
volved with the movement105 under section 274 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA), which prohibits the unlawful 
“bringing in and harboring [of]  certain aliens.”106 The prosecu-
tion of these sanctuary advocates illustrated competing legal in-
terpretations regarding the provision of a safe haven for the Cen-
tral American refugees. Whereas the Sanctuary Movement 
participants saw their actions as religious expressions, the gov-
ernment viewed the provision of sanctuary as “alien smug-
gling.”107 
Ultimately, the government prevailed, revealing the limits 
of the Sanctuary Movement’s legal positions. In the notable pros-
ecution of John Fife, one of the key founders of the Sanctuary 
Movement, and other members of the movement, the court found 
 
a Cohesive Approach to the Current Movement, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 
137–39, 142, 146 n.60 (2008). 
 100. See id. at 143 n.45 (describing the atrocities from which the immigrants 
were fleeing).  
 101. Cf. id. at 143 (noting church workers, motivated by religious beliefs, 
declared their grounds as public sanctuaries in defiance of federal immigration 
law). 
 102. See Villarruel, supra note 95, at 1430 (noting members felt sincere reli-
gious beliefs motivated their acts). 
 103. See Begaj, supra note 99, at 154 (stating interpretations of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, and highlighting individuals practicing their sincere religious be-
liefs). 
 104. See Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the 
Politics of Citizens Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 902 (1995) (noting the 
government dismissed the Movement as irrelevant piety). 
 105. See Sophie H. Pirie, The Origins of a Political Trial: The Sanctuary 
Movement and Political Justice, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 381, 383 (1990) (noting 
federal agencies undertook undercover investigations that led to criminal in-
dictments). 
 106. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414–477, 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012)). 
 107. Villarruel, supra note 95, at 1431. 
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them guilty.108 Among other things, Fife and the other sanctuary 
workers—whom the court recognized as operating a “modern-
day underground railroad”—were convicted of aiding and abet-
ting the unlawful entry of immigrants to the United States.109 
As the prosecution and conviction of the Sanctuary Movement 
members made evident, the ability of a church to provide a safe 
haven is circumscribed by the INA. 
The prosecution of the Sanctuary Movement members did 
little to deter other churches and groups from assisting immi-
grants, however. Through the years, churches continued to pro-
vide shelter, food, and other resources to immigrants who lacked 
authorization to remain in the United States.110 Indeed, the 
number of churches that have declared themselves sanctuaries 
increased in the last few years and certainly since November 
2016.111 In 2014, there were thirteen churches that provided 
sanctuary to undocumented families.112 Today, there are over 
800 churches and temples nationwide that have pledged that 
they would welcome undocumented immigrants and confer them 
with sanctuary.113 In addition, mosques have also been sites of 
safe havens.114 
 
 108. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 666 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989). How-
ever, none of the participants ended up serving prison time but were rather 
placed on probation. See Clyde Haberman, Trump and the Battle Over Sanctu-
ary in America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
03/05/us/sanctuary-cities-movement-1980s-political-asylum.html (stating that 
John Fife was convicted but did not serve time in jail). Further, litigation a few 
years later, including a class-action lawsuit on behalf of the Central American 
migrants, led to a settlement finding the federal government was indeed biased 
against the applicants and ordered reconsideration of the asylum applications 
of the class members. See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 
796 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 
(9th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court findings that the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service violated the rights of El Salvadoran and Guatemalan asy-
lum applications). 
 109. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 666 n.1. 
 110. See generally Begaj, supra note 99 (comparing the Sanctuary Movement 
of the 1980s with the “New Sanctuary Movement” of the early 2000s). 
 111. Elizabeth Evans & Yonat Shimron, ‘Sanctuary Churches’ Vow to Shield 
Immigrants from Trump Crackdown, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://religionnews.com/2016/11/18/sanctuary-churches-vow-to-shield 
-immigrants-from-trump-crackdown. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Ashley Archibald, Mosques, Churches, Synagogues and Temples Rekin-
dle the Sanctuary Movement to Protect Refugees and Immigrants from Deporta-
tion, REAL CHANGE NEWS (June 21, 2017), http://www.realchangenews.org/ 
2017/06/21/mosques-churches-synagogues-and-temples-rekindle-sanctuary 
-movement-protect-refugees-and. 
 114. E.g., id. 
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As the number of undocumented immigrants and families 
increased and the federal government ramped up deportation 
programs, the goals of churches to provide safe spaces to undoc-
umented immigrants have shifted toward keeping families to-
gether in the United States. In particular, many immigrants 
who obtained sanctuary in churches were those who sought to 
avoid deportation so that they may continue to be with their U.S. 
citizen children.115 
The reasons for providing safe havens continue to be 
grounded on religious and moral grounds. Consider the story of 
Jeanette Vizguerra, the first undocumented immigrant to seek 
sanctuary after the election of President Trump.116 When 
Vizguerra failed to obtain a stay of removal from ICE, she sought 
refuge from a church in Colorado to avoid being removed from 
the United States.117 In providing sanctuary to her, the pastor of 
the church explained that “as a people of faith,” doing so was 
“sacred, faithful work.”118 Indeed, the provision of sanctuary as 
based on Judeo-Christian beliefs continues to dominate much of 
the narrative deployed today among church members providing 
safe havens to undocumented immigrants. Citing the Book of 
Matthew, for example, a pastor in a Philadelphia church that 
declared itself a sanctuary stated a month after the election that, 
“Jesus said that we are to provide hospitality to the stranger.”119 
Thus, similar to the churches involved with the Sanctuary Move-
ment of the 1980s, religious groups offering sanctuary have in-
voked biblical and theological grounds. As Reverend John Fife 
said earlier this year, “sometimes . . . you cannot love both God 
and the civil authority.”120 
 
 115. Cf. Children of Illegal Immigrants, PBS (May 26, 2006), http://www 
.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2006/05/26/may-26-2006-children-of-illegal 
-immigrants/18834 (noting the thousands of families facing the familial strug-
gles associated with the threat of deportation). 
 116. Time Magazine later named Jeanette Vizguerra as one of Time’s most 
influential people. Jesse Paul, Mom Living in Denver Church for Sanctuary 
Among TIME’s 100 Most Influential People, DENV. POST (Apr. 20, 2017), http:// 
www.denverpost.com/2017/04/20/jeanette-vizguerra-sanctuary-time-magazine. 
 117. Joel Rose, Sanctuary Churches Brace for Clash With Trump Admin-
istration, NPR (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/16/515510996/ 
colorado-church-offers-immigrant-sanctuary-from-deportation. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era Im-
migrant Sanctuaries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/12/27/us/houses-of-worship-poised-to-serve-as-trump-era-immigrant 
-sanctuaries.html. 
 120. Haberman, supra note 108. 
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Yet, as in the past, many religious groups today maintain 
that their actions constitute lawful exercise of their religious be-
liefs. In addition to the First Amendment, religious leaders today 
have also grounded their support in the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act (RFRA).121 Passed in 1993, RFRA prohibits the 
government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise 
of religion”122 unless it “demonstrates that application of the bur-
den to the person is in furtherance of a compelling government 
interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling government interest.”123 Thus, religious leaders con-
tend that providing sanctuary constitutes the exercise of their 
religious beliefs protected by RFRA.124 
In addition to asserting the right to practice their religion, 
some church leaders have also relied on their rights as private 
property owners to protect the people seeking sanctuary in their 
buildings. Churches and other religious buildings constitute pri-
vate property125 and are accorded the same right to exclude given 
to all private property owners under the common law. As such, 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement126 applies to 
searches of a church as it would to any other private property. 
Church leaders have demonstrated their understanding of the 
power of private property and the Fourth Amendment in provid-
ing sanctuary. For instance, Cardinal Blase Cupich of Chicago 
explained to priests that they should always demand to see a 
 
 121. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 
to 2000bb-4 (2012). 
 122. Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
 123. Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) to (2). 
 124. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3, United States v. Warren, 
No. CR-18-00223-001-TUC-RCC (BPV), 2018 WL 4403753 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 
2018), 2018 WL 4057307 (arguing that RFRA protects the defendant from being 
prosecuted for harboring unauthorized immigrants). But see Warren, No. CR-
18-00223-001-TUC-RCC (BPV), 2018 WL 4403753, at *4–5 (denying the defend-
ant’s motion to dismiss because the underlying facts relied on were in dispute). 
See generally Thomas Scott-Railton, Note, A Legal Sanctuary: How the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Could Protect Sanctuary Churches, 128 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (providing a comprehensive analysis of a church 
and other faith-based group’s reliance on RFRA to offer sanctuary to immi-
grants). 
 125. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 
573 (2d. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the church is private property); see also 
Youngblood v. Florida, No. 3:01-CV-1449-J-16, 2006 WL 288248, at *5 (M.D. 
Fla. Feb. 6, 2006) (assuming church property is private). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting persons from unreasonable searches 
and seizures). 
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judicially signed warrant and refuse entry to immigration au-
thorizes without one.127 
Aware of the strong protections that the Fourth Amendment 
provides to a person’s home,128 some churches have even pur-
chased houses to provide a safe haven for immigrants.129 For ex-
ample, a church in Los Angeles has renovated and built homes 
that members stated would be specifically provided for undocu-
mented immigrant families.130 Placing the families there 
achieves a number of goals: the church was able to provide hous-
ing for the families and, by putting them in private property, the 
families residing there may require a warrant before immigra-
tion authorities may enter.131 As one of the members explained, 
they have “incorporate[ed] private homes, which offer a higher 
level of constitutional protection than houses of worship and an 
ability to make it harder for federal agents to find undocumented 
immigrants.”132 
Most interestingly, to further bolster their legal argument 
for providing sanctuary, some churches assert that, unlike their 
predecessors, they are not hiding undocumented immigrants 
from detection as prohibited by INA section 274 which prohibits 
“harboring” of unlawfully present persons.133 Church leaders 
have explained that they are not concealing the immigrants be-
cause they have publicly announced that undocumented immi-
grants have sought refuge in their churches.134 ICE is thus 
aware where the immigrants may be found and may enter the 
church’s property as long as ICE has warrants to arrest the un-
documented immigrants. 
 
 127. See Manya Brachear Pashman, Cupich to Priests: No Entry for Immi-
gration Agents Without Warrants, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-cardinal-cupich-immigration 
-directive-20170301-story.html (explaining a church’s policy to ask for a war-
rant before immigration authorities may enter the church). 
 128. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating the right of persons to secure their 
houses against unreasonable searches). 
 129. Kyung Lah et al., An Underground Network Readies Homes to Hide Un-
documented Immigrants, CNN (Feb. 26, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/ 
us/california-immigrant-safe-houses/index.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414-477, § 274, 66 Stat. 
163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012)). 
 134. Sarah Quezada, How Churches Can Give Sanctuary and Still Support 
the Law, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.christianitytoday 
.com/women/2017/march/how-churches-can-give-sanctuary-to-immigrants-and 
-still-sup.html. 
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Thus far, none of the churches that have offered sanctuary 
have faced legal challenges from the Trump Administration. A 
policy issued under the Obama Administration135 treats 
churches, like schools and hospitals, as “sensitive locations” in 
which ICE would not enforce immigration law.136 
As the foregoing account details, churches as sites of sanc-
tuary began in the 1980s with the assertion of a moral calling to 
assist Central American immigrants from being deported to 
their home countries. But their actions were also grounded, al-
beit unsuccessfully, on what they viewed as their First Amend-
ment rights. Moreover, today, religious sanctuary actions have 
relied on new legal grounds, including RFRA and property 
rights. 
B. SANCTUARY CITIES 
In today’s political climate, the term “sanctuary” is more of-
ten associated with its other traditional meaning—“sanctuary 
cities.” As noted earlier, discussion about “sanctuary cities” has 
centered on federalism issues. It is helpful to note, however, that 
“sanctuary cities” arose at around the same time that individu-
als and groups formed the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, 
demonstrating the roots of a collaborative public and private 
sanctuary movement. The City of Davis, California, for example, 
passed a resolution on March 5, 1986 “affirming the support of 
the City of Davis for efforts to provide sanctuary to refugees flee-
ing persecution in El Salvador and Guatemala.”137 Additionally, 
the Davis resolution stated that “no agency or employee of the 
City of Davis shall officially assist with investigations or arrest 
 
 135. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enf ’ t to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel of U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf ’ t (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf. 
 136. The Trump Administration asserts that the sensitive locations policy 
remains in effect. See FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, U.S. 
DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.ice.gov/ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (explaining that sensitive locations include churches, 
schools, and medical facilities, and stating “yes” to the question “Does ICE’s 
sensitive locations policy remain in effect?”). However, there have been reports 
of immigration officers going to medical facilities to arrest undocumented immi-
grants. John Burnett, Border Patrol Arrests Parents While Infant Awaits Seri-
ous Operation, NPR (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/20/5523399 
76/border-patrol-arrests-parents-while-infant-awaits-serious-operation. 
 137. Davis City Council Res. No. 5407, Series 1986 (Cal. 1986), http:// 
documents.cityofdavis.org/Media/Default/Documents/PDF/CMO/Sanctuary 
-City/Resolution-5407-Establishing-Davis-as-a-Sanctuary-City.pdf. 
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procedures” relating to alleged violations of immigration law by 
Central American refugees.138 Other cities enacted more specific 
policies that limited local involvement with immigration enforce-
ment, particularly with respect to sharing information about the 
noncitizen’s status with federal officials. For instance, in 1989, 
the Mayor of New York City passed Executive Order 124, which 
limited their employees from “transmit[ing] information respect-
ing any alien to federal immigration authorities” unless required 
by law, consented to by the noncitizen, or the noncitizen was in-
volved in a criminal activity.139 
There are various types of sanctuary city policies. While 
there are those that are more symbolic and seek to create a wel-
coming city, others are more proactive by establishing protocols 
designed to maintain the confidentiality of an individual’s un-
documented status and ensure open communication between 
residents and public employees, especially law enforcement of-
ficers.140 Regardless of their articulated purpose, the sanctuary 
policies issued in these jurisdictions were grounded in their as-
sertion that local police powers delegated to them by the state 
allow them to protect the public’s general welfare through such 
enactments.141 At the end of 2008, sanctuary policies restricting 
local authorities from immigration enforcement existed in four 
states and nearly seventy cities and counties.142 By the end of 
2013, California, Colorado, Connecticut, and several localities 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. N.Y.C., N.Y., EXEC. ORDER NO. 124, CITY POLICY CONCERNING ALIENS 
(1989), http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/executive_orders/1989EO124 
.PDF. 
 140. Police chiefs in particular have framed their support for sanctuary pol-
icies along community safety goals. Chuck Wexler, Police Chiefs Across the 
Country Support Sanctuary Cities Because They Keep Crime Down, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wexler-sanctuary 
-cities-immigration-crime-20170306-story.html. 
 141. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (dis-
cussing the state delegation of police powers to local governments). 
 142. Laura Sullivan, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat 
Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the Na-
tional Crime Information Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 568 (2009) 
(citing the National Immigration Law Center’s December 2008 report on local 
sanctuary laws). 
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passed laws limiting police assistance with immigration enforce-
ment.143 A year later, Rhode Island and over 300 counties and 
cities joined the movement.144 
These acts of legal resistance in which “sanctuary cities” ac-
tively engaged did not go unnoticed. In 1996, Congress enacted 
legislation intended to address local noncooperation policies and 
encourage state and local governments to participate in federal 
immigration enforcement.145 Subsequently codified as 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373, this law prevents state and local governments from issu-
ing “gag-orders” to their officers regarding communication with 
federal authorities about immigration and citizenship infor-
mation.146 Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 reads in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a 
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, 
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending 
to, or receiving from, the [federal immigration enforcement agency] in-
formation regarding the . . . immigration status . . . of any individ-
ual.147 
No doubt, despite the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 suggesting 
its terms are not compulsory, the statute seeks to impose limits 
on sanctuary cities. As such, the statute implicitly recognizes the 
power of cities to operate their own governments without being 
subject to federal commandeering actions. Indeed, soon after the 
passage of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, New York City, which was seeking to 
maintain its sanctuary city policy, challenged the constitution-
ality of the law on Tenth Amendment grounds but ultimately 
 
 143. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., IMMIGRANT-INCLUSIVE STATE AND LO-
CAL POLICIES MOVE AHEAD IN 2014–15, at 19 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2016/02/pro-immigrant-policies-move-ahead-2015-12.pdf.  
 144. Id. 
 145. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1642 (2012)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373 (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104–725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (stat-
ing that the “conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority to 
communicate with the [Immigration and Naturalization Services] regarding the 
presence, whereabouts, or activities of ”  undocumented immigrants); S. REP. 
NO. 104–249, at 19–20 (1996) (“The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of 
immigration-related information by State and local agencies is consistent 
with . . . the Federal regulation of immigration . . . .”). 
 146. Martin Kaste, As Trump Moves Forward on Immigration Plan, ‘Sanc-
tuary Cities’ Push Back, NPR (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/27/ 
512047222/as-trump-moves-forward-on-immigration-plan-sanctuary-cities 
-push-back. 
 147. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). 
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failed.148 In New York City v. United States, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit explained that Congress has not “com-
pelled state and local governments to enact or administer any 
federal regulatory program.”149 As such, Congress did not violate 
the Tenth Amendment when it enacted legislation limiting state 
and local governments from forbidding all voluntary cooperation 
by state or local government employees with specific federal pro-
grams, including immigration enforcement.150 At the same time, 
however, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 does not “affirma-
tively conscript[ ] states, localities, or their employees into the 
federal government’s service.”151 
The tension between the scope of the federal government’s 
immigration powers and power of a city to wield its police powers 
is at the heart of the Tenth Amendment debates. Ultimately, 
courts would need to resolve the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 to de-
termine whether it violates the anti-commandeering principle 
that the Supreme Court has found to be part of the Tenth 
Amendment.152 Indeed, sanctuary cities such as Chicago and 
Philadelphia have challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373 on precisely these grounds.153 
 
 148. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999) (ex-
plaining New York City’s contention that Congress is “forbid[ding] state and 
local government entities from controlling the use of information regarding the 
immigration status of individuals obtained in the course of their official busi-
ness” in violation of the city’s Tenth Amendment rights). 
 149. Id. at 35. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. It should be noted that the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is 
itself contested. City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (challenging the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1373); Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-00485-DMR), 2017 WL 412999. Fur-
ther, although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the con-
stitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, City of New York, 179 F.3d 29, commentators 
have argued that the court erred in reaching its conclusion. Vikram David Amar 
& Michael Schaps, How Strong Is San Francisco’s “Sanctuary City” Lawsuit 
Against the Trump Administration?, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Feb. 10, 2017), https:// 
verdict.justia.com/2017/02/10/strong-san-franciscos-sanctuary-city-lawsuit 
-trump-administration. 
 152. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–25 (1997) (holding that the 
Tenth Amendment prevents the federal government from commandeering the 
states). 
 153. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (grant-
ing in part and denying part, Chicago’s motion for preliminary injunction 
against the Attorney General’s attempt to deny certain Department of Justice 
(DOJ) administered funds to the city). In his order, Judge Leinenweber specifi-
cally addressed the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1373. He suggested that the 
governing case law does not render the statute obviously unconstitutional, but 
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Seeking to punish sanctuary cities that continue to defy 8 
U.S.C. § 1373, President Trump issued E.O. 13,768 to withdraw 
federal funds that sanctuary cities receive from the federal gov-
ernment.154 However, as explained in Part I, E.O. 13,768 failed 
to define what constitutes a sanctuary jurisdiction or what aa 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 means. The vagueness of the lan-
guage of E.O. 13,768 and potential loss of federal funds prompted 
Santa Clara County and the City of San Francisco to file a law-
suit against President Trump days after he issued the executive 
order.155 The amount of money they stood to lose was far from 
insignificant: in 2015–16, Santa Clara County received $1.7 bil-
lion, which is approximately “35% of the County’s total reve-
nues.”156 San Francisco receives $1.2 billion, which is about 12% 
of its $9.6 billion annual budget.157 Eventually, the court in 
County of Santa Clara v. Trump enjoined the enforcement of 
E.O. 13,768 finding it facially problematic because the order was 
too broadly written.158 
Notably, sanctuary cities have gone beyond noncooperation 
policies. Many cities have engaged their police powers to take on 
more defensive stances. For example, some cities refuse to honor 
detainer requests from the federal government.159 After the No-
vember 2016 election, many city leaders reaffirmed this pol-
icy.160 Thus far, there are over 600 county jurisdictions that have 
 
noted that, depending on a higher court’s interpretation of the law’s practical 
impact, it could be found so. Id. at 948–49. The case is still being litigated. 
 154. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal 
Funds from Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 60, 60, https://www 
.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2017-issues/april-2017.pdf. 
 155. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Santa Clara, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 1196 (No. 17-cv-00574), 2017 WL 412999; see also Santa Clara, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 1196, aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom by City & County 
of San Francisco, 897 F.3d 1225; Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 
(Jan. 25, 2017). 
 156. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 512 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 157. Id. at 513. 
 158. See id. at 540 (enjoining section 9(a) of the Executive Order, but leaving 
intact the Government’s lawful ability to enforce existing federal grant condi-
tions and designate localities as “sanctuary jurisdiction[s]”). This order was af-
firmed on appeal, though the injunction was limited to California until the dis-
trict court could develop a sufficient record to justify a nationwide injunction 
City & County of San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1245. 
 159. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801; U.S. IMMIGRATION & 
CUSTOMS ENF ’T, supra note 53, at 4–23. 
 160. Many cities appeared on a “non-cooperation jurisdictions” list that the 
federal government released. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF ’T, supra 
note 53, at 4–23. 
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non-detainer policies, asserting that they are not required to 
honor detainer requests.161 The argument thus far has prevailed. 
As the court in County of Santa Clara noted, courts have held 
that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment to hold a nonciti-
zen beyond the scheduled release because “civil detainer re-
quests are often not supported by an individualized determina-
tion of probable cause that a crime has been committed.”162 
Indeed, in a July 2017 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held that state and local authorities do not have au-
thority under the common law to detain a noncitizen after re-
lease from jail.163 
Still another new way that cities have legally resisted fed-
eral immigration enforcement is the establishment of policies 
that provide free legal assistance to undocumented immigrants 
and children in removal hearings.164 Among these are Austin, 
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and 
Washington, D.C.165 The provision of legal services may perhaps 
be a quintessential form of safe haven. Although noncitizens 
have the right to a lawyer in removal hearings, the government 
does not provide legal services.166 Noncitizens must find and pay 
for their own lawyers and most immigrants are unrepresented 
 
 161. Jasmine C. Lee et al., What Are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities 
.html. 
 162. Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 510. 
 163. Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1160 (Mass. 2017). 
 164. Teresa Wiltz, Amid Immigration Crackdown, Cities Step in with 
Free Legal Aid, HUFFPOST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/entry/amid-immigration-crackdown-cities-step-in-with-free_us_ 
5a046701e4b055de8d096af0. 
 165. Maura Ewing, Should Taxpayers Sponsor Attorneys for Undocumented 
Immigrants?, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2017/05/should-taxpayers-sponsor-attorneys-for-undocumented-immi-
grants/525162; Wiltz, supra note 164. Last year, eleven local jurisdictions joined 
the Safety and Fairness for Everyone (SAFE) Cities Network, “a multi-jurisdic-
tion network dedicated to providing publicly-funded representation for people 
facing deportation.” SAFE Cities Network Launches: 11 Communities United to 
Provide Public Defense to Immigrants Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST. 
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/safe-cities 
-network-launches-11-communities-united-to-provide-public-defense-to 
-immigrants-facing-deportation. Those communities include Atlanta; Austin; 
Baltimore; Chicago; Columbus; Dane County, Wisconsin; Oakland and Alameda 
County, California; Prince George’s County, Maryland; Sacramento; San Anto-
nio; and Santa Ana, California. Id. 
 166. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (providing that noncitizens are entitled to a law-
yer during removal hearings but at their own expense). 
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in removal hearings.167 A sanctuary city’s provision of legal ser-
vices provides the necessary form of legal resistance to the power 
of the federal government to remove a noncitizen. The mere pres-
ence of legal counsel dramatically alters the prospects for noncit-
izens in removal proceedings.168 Notably, this form of legal defi-
ance is now statewide in New York169 and California170 and 
advocates in other states are pushing their states to pass similar 
legislation.171 
Crucially, it is not only cities that have expanded the 
measures taken to protect and support immigrants through non-
cooperation policies, refusal to honor detainers, and provisions 
of legal aid to immigrants in removal hearings. California, has 
become a “sanctuary state” with the passage of Senate Bill (S.B.) 
54.172 This law limits state and local law enforcement officers 
from communicating with federal immigration authorities about 
a person’s immigration status.173 Effective on January 1, 2018, 
S.B. 54 also prevents law enforcement officials from asking 
about a person’s immigration status and detaining them for vio-
lating immigration law.174 
 
 167. E.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to 
Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (finding that only 
thirty-seven percent of immigrants had counsel in removal cases decided on the 
merits between 2007 and 2012). 
 168. Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2289 (2012) 
(discussing how the provision of legal services to immigrants decreases their 
chances of being removed from the United States). 
 169. Governor Cuomo Announces Passage of the FY 2018 State Budget, GOV-
ERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/ 
governor-cuomo-announces-passage-fy-2018-state-budget (provisioning $10 
million to establish the Liberty Defense Project, which will help provide immi-
grants with representation). 
 170. Katy Murphy, California Budget Deal Includes Deportation Defense Funds 
for Undocumented Immigrants, MERCURY NEWS (June 17, 2017), https://www 
.mercurynews.com/2017/06/16/california-budget-deal-includes-deportation-defense 
-for-undocumented-immigrants (announcing legislative approval of a $45 million 
budget to provide undocumented individuals with immigration services and re-
moval defense). 
 171. E.g., Ted Sherman, Groups Push N.J. to Provide Legal Assistance to Those 
Facing Deportation, NJ.COM (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2018/01/advocates_push_nj_to_provide_legal_assistance_to_t.html. 
 172. S.B. 54, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 7282–7284.12 (West 2018)); see also Natalie Delgadillo, California Is Now an 
Official ‘Sanctuary State.’ Will Others Follow?, GOVERNING (Sept. 18, 2017) 
(noting that, while Oregon has been a sanctuary state for thirty years, this law 
will make California “the nation’s strictest ‘sanctuary state’”). 
 173. S.B. 54, ch. 495, sec. 3, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733, 3738–40 (codified at CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 7284.6). 
 174. Id. 
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In sum, as they did in the 1980s, sanctuary cities today con-
tinue to provide safe havens to undocumented immigrants. The 
scope of protection has evolved, however, from prohibiting law 
enforcement officers from communicating information about a 
person’s immigration status with federal officers to broader 
forms of protections, including refusing to honor detainer re-
quests and providing free legal assistance to immigrants to di-
rectly challenge their removal from the United States. Notably, 
“sanctuary cities” have led to broader public sanctuaries, includ-
ing at least one sanctuary state. 
C. NEW SANCTUARIES 
The term sanctuary has been mainly understood along these 
traditional religious and law enforcement-focused dimensions. 
However, sanctuary today has expanded beyond traditional 
forms. As this Section explains, immigrants’ rights advocates 
have developed innovative ways of seeking to protect immi-
grants and their families. While new sanctuary sites have 
emerged—schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and communi-
ties—pioneering methods in the form of technology and social 
networks have also developed. Importantly, these novel types of 
sanctuary have their own distinct and underexplored legal foun-
dations adding to the web of legal sources that support defiance 
of federal immigration enforcement. 
1. Sanctuary Campuses and School Districts 
Almost immediately after the November 2016 election, a 
number of universities declared themselves “sanctuary cam-
puses” or issued policies that offer protection and support for 
DACA and other undocumented students.175 Thus far, students, 
faculty and advocates in more than 200 universities have pushed 
for such noncooperation policies and, to date, more than 75 uni-
versities have adopted them.176 Yet, what constitutes a “sanctu-
ary campus” has varied. Some universities have openly em-
braced the “sanctuary campus” moniker. In announcing itself a 
sanctuary campus, for example, Wesleyan University stated that 
“[w]e would not cooperate with any efforts to round up people, 
 
 175. For an informal list of “sanctuary campuses,” see Xavier Maciel, Sanc-
tuary Campus Petitions, GOOGLE SHEETS, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/ 
d/1fHOHRFxzo_Pp85rR_58ug4rMv9WODPDmRLK0dP2FT-k/edit#gid=0 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 176. See id. 
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unless we were forced to.”177 Other universities, such as the Uni-
versity of California, have chosen not to adopt the “sanctuary 
campus” label but have issued policies that essentially provide 
the same type of support.178 Some, such as Columbia University, 
have pushed further and have announced that they will not al-
low immigration officials to enter their campuses without a war-
rant or share the undocumented students’ information with im-
migration officials unless they are required to do so by a 
subpoena or a court order or authorized by the student.179 These 
examples reveal the spectrum of “sanctuary” policies among 
these campuses.180 
Sanctuary campuses and their desire to protect undocu-
mented students raise legal questions that are distinguishable 
from traditional public and private sanctuaries. To be sure, they 
implicate issues that concern both public and private dimen-
sions. Because they provide housing to students, both public and 
private universities may be subject to the anti-harboring provi-
sion of the INA.181 Further, public universities, as employees of 
a state or a city, may be bound by the restrictions of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373.182 Yet, at least two points about universities prompt dis-
tinct legal issues. First, universities, whether public or private, 
are institutions that occupy physical spaces and are tasked with 
educating and protecting students. As such, courts have afforded 
them with discretion to regulate who may enter their premises 
in order to achieve their goals. Drawing on cases in which courts 
have upheld a university’s right to exclude under the common 
law of property, universities may opt to exercise their rights and 
 
 177. See Megan, supra note 12. 
 178. See Preston, supra note 13. 
 179. See Aaron Holmes, University to Provide Sanctuary, Financial Support 
for Undocumented Students, COLUM. SPECTATOR (Nov. 22, 2016), http:// 
columbiaspectator.com/news/2016/11/21/university-provide-sanctuary 
-financial-support-undocumented-students. 
 180. Sanctuary zones in school entrances are related to sanctuary campuses. 
The goal of sanctuary zones is to help students feel safe and welcomed in their 
schools. See Mina Bloom, Logan Square Schools Are Now ‘‘Sanctuary Zones,’’ 
Declares Neighborhood Group, DNAINFO (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dnainfo 
.com/chicago/20170217/logan-square/logan-square-neighborhood-association 
-cps-schools-sanctuary-zones. 
 181. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).  
 182. See id. § 1373(a) (2012) (“[A] Federal, State, or local government entity 
may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service in-
formation regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, 
of any individual.”). 
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exclude ICE from campus, or at least certain parts of the cam-
puses.183 
Second, universities are bound by federal privacy laws that 
serve to further protect the rights of students. Specifically, the 
Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) prohibits 
both public and private universities from revealing confidential 
student information to any third-party.184 Information that may 
not be disclosed (assuming the university obtained such infor-
mation) arguably includes immigration status. Importantly, vio-
lations of these privacy laws can result in withdrawal of federal 
funds from universities.185 Apart from the concern over raids or 
enforcement activities on campus, the primary concern for un-
documented students (or other potentially removable nonciti-
zens) is the security of their personal information that may be in 
the hands of university staff and in university databases. 
Universities are generally not obligated to collect infor-
mation about a student’s undocumented status.186 Indeed, uni-
versities—whether public or private—are not prevented from 
enrolling undocumented students under federal law.187 Con-
versely, they are not obligated to admit undocumented students 
either.188 In the wake of this legal latitude, some states have 
passed laws determining that institutions of higher learning can 
 
 183. See Souders v. Lucero, 196 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the university constitutionally fulfilled its duty to protect students on campus 
by excluding an alumnus for stalking behavior); Albright v. Univ. of Toledo, No. 
01AP-130, 2001 WL 1084461, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2001) (approaching 
the university’s ability to exclude people from a property interest perspective); 
see also IMMIGRATION RESPONSE INITIATIVE, supra note 90 at 26. 
 184. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g 
(2012). 
 185. Id. § 1234c(a)(1) (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Education to withhold 
funding for FERPA violations); see also United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 
797, 818–19 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s discretionary injunc-
tion against a university for violating FERPA as opposed to damages or with-
holding of federal funding). 
 186. See Office for Civil Rights, Information on the Rights of All Children to 
Enroll in School: Questions and Answers for States, School Districts and Par-
ents, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa 
-201101.html (last modified Sept. 25, 2018) (warning educators that, in order to 
comply with all state and federal laws, they must be careful not to “discourage 
[ ] the enrollment of undocumented children, such as [by] asking for immigra-
tion papers or social security numbers”). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Matt Vasilogambros, The Folly of Under-educating the Undocu-
mented, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2016/03/the-folly-of-under-educating-the-undocumented/473877. 
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admit undocumented students, and going further, that public in-
stitutions can offer them in-state tuition rates under some cir-
cumstances.189 
In other words, a university is in a unique position to pro-
vide protection for undocumented students in ways that differ 
from, and are arguably stronger than, sanctuary cities or 
churches and other private groups. Like “sanctuary cities,” how-
ever, this new form of sanctuary has garnered criticism from 
lawmakers. By early December 2016, lawmakers introduced a 
bill in Congress entitled “No Funding for Sanctuary Campuses 
Act,” which would deny funding to a university that the federal 
government determines to be a “sanctuary campus.”190 State leg-
islators have responded as well. In Alabama, for example, the 
House of Representatives passed a bill that would allow the 
state’s attorney general to pull state funds from sanctuary cam-
puses.191 In addition, certain colleges in Georgia are forbidden 
from maintaining noncooperation policies.192 
On a related scale, several public school districts around the 
country have also issued “sanctuary schools” resolutions that, 
like the sanctuary campuses discussed above, are designed to 
provide safe spaces for their undocumented students.193 The res-
olutions typically also bar ICE agents from campus unless they 
have a warrant to arrest a particular student.194 Among the rea-
sons provided by some school districts regarding the issuance of 
such resolutions include their constitutional obligation to edu-
cate all students, regardless of immigration status,195 a legal ba-
sis that is distinguishable from the sources supporting sanctuary 
 
 189. See Stephen L. Nelson et al., Reduced Tuition Benefits for Undocu-
mented Immigrant Students: The Implications of a Piecemeal Approach to Poli-
cymaking, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 897, 911 (2013) (discussing how twelve 
states granted in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students in 2013, 
namely California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New 
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Washington). 
 190. No Funding for Sanctuary Campuses Act, H.R. 483, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 191. Bryan Lyman, Alabama House Approves ‘Sanctuary Campus’ Bill, 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser 
.com/story/news/politics/southunionstreet/2017/02/14/alabama-house-approves 
-sanctuary-campus-bill/97929404. 
 192. GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-3-10 (2018). 
 193. See Ray Sanchez, US Public Schools Take Steps to Protect Undocu-
mented Students, CNN (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/us/ 
public-schools-immigration-crackdown/index.html (discussing school districts 
in various cities that issued resolutions to support their undocumented stu-
dents). 
 194. See id. 
 195. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (affirming the Fourteenth 
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universities. That is, the presence of ICE agents on campus may 
arguably deprive undocumented students an education out of 
fear that going to school would lead to arrest and removal from 
the United States. 
2. Sanctuary Workplaces 
Another innovation in the sanctuary movement is the provi-
sion of safe havens in the workplace. Efforts conducted by a 
group, Restaurant Opportunity Centers United (ROCU), exem-
plify this nascent part of the sanctuary movement. ROCU, along 
with supporters, including other restaurants, have signed poli-
cies that are designed to support and provide resources to their 
workers.196 These workplace sanctuary policies include prohibit-
ing harassment of an individual based on immigrant or refugee 
status, displaying prominently a “SANCTUARY RESTAU-
RANTS: A Place At the Table for Everyone” sign in the estab-
lishment, and working with a peer network to assist workers 
that may be targeted by the administration.197 These private pol-
icies have been encouraged and supported by some municipali-
ties. For instance, at least two cities in California—Oakland and 
Emeryville—have passed resolutions asking businesses to estab-
lish “sanctuary workplaces” that promote an environment free 
from harassment on the basis of immigration status.198 
 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause protecting undocumented children’s 
right to guaranteed K-12 education). 
 196. ‘Sanctuary Restaurants’ Movement Launches to Promote Hate and Dis-
crimination Free Workplaces, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITY CENTERS UNITED 
(Jan. 4, 2017), http://rocunited.org/2017/01/sanctuary-restaurants-movement 
-launches-promote-hate-discrimination-free-workplaces (explaining that the 
Sanctuary Restaurant Movement’s main purpose is to “offer[ ] support and re-
sources to restaurant workers, employers and consumers impacted by hostile 
policies and actions, including immigrants, Muslims, LGBTQI people and oth-
ers”). 
 197. Id. There are currently 387 restaurants nationwide that have affirmed 
the principles of sanctuary workplace policies. See Sanctuary Restaurants, 
SANCTUARY RESTAURANTS, http://sanctuaryrestaurants.org (last visited Nov. 
11, 2018); see also Joshua Sabatini, San Francisco Restaurant Owners Offer 
Employees Sanctuary Workplace, S.F. EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www 
.sfexaminer.com/san-francisco-restaurant-owners-offer-employees-sanctuary 
-workplace (explaining that the Golden Gate Restaurant Association, which rep-
resents about 1000 restaurants in San Francisco, which in turn represents ap-
proximately 60,000 workers, has agreed to implement the anti-harassment com-
ponents of the Sanctuary Restaurant Movement principles and other support 
policies). 
 198. Riley McDermid, Oakland Passes Resolution Asking Businesses to Cre-
ate Sanctuary Workplaces, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www 
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Other employers have adopted more proactive and protec-
tive actions on behalf of their employees. In particular, those in-
volved with the sanctuary restaurants movement have ex-
pressed that they will refuse entry to immigration law 
enforcement officers.199 For example, when ICE officers showed 
up in a café in Ann Arbor, Michigan, to look for an individual, 
the owner of the café refused to allow the ICE agents to walk 
through the kitchen.200 As private property owners, restaurant 
owners have the right under the Fourth Amendment to demand 
to see a judicial or administrative warrant before ICE may con-
stitutionally enter the property.201 The right of restaurant own-
ers to refuse entry is particularly helpful in the workplace in 
light of reports of incidents of ICE agents showing up at restau-
rants to arrest workers.202 Notably, a newly enacted California 
law, A.B. 450,203 demonstrates the extent to which sanctuary 
workplaces, which are primarily located in the private contexts, 
have merged with public sanctuaries. A.B. 450 extends sanctu-
ary protections in the workplace by barring employers from cer-
tain forms of cooperation with ICE unless ICE has a judicial war-
rant and requiring notice to employees of ICE enforcement 
activities.204 
Workers and unions have also called for the protection of 
their members’ information, urging their employers not to share 
them with immigration authorities unless required by law, such 
as I-9 requirements.205 Employers are required to verify that 
 
.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/04/19/oakland-immigration 
-sanctuary-workplaces.html. 
 199. Haynes, supra note 14. 
 200. Id. 
 201. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). 
 202. ICE Agents Eat Breakfast, Compliment Chef, then Arrest 3 Workers at 
Michigan Restaurant, CHI. TRIB. (May 26, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune 
.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-michigan-restaurant-immigration-arrests 
-20170525-story.html. 
 203. A.B. 450, ch. 492, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3723 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 7285.1–.3 (West 2017) and CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 90.2 and 1019.2 (West 2017)). 
Note, however, that A.B. 450—specifically its provisions requiring employers to 
withhold consent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) searches 
without a judicial warrant—has been preliminary enjoined by a district court 
on the grounds that the state law violates the intergovernmental immunities 
doctrine. See United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 
2018). 
 204. See A.B. 450, ch. 492, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3723, 3724–26. 
 205. Tim Goulet, We Are a Sanctuary Union, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (June 
28, 2017), https://socialistworker.org/2017/06/28/we-are-a-sanctuary-union. To 
provide verification for this article and sanctuary resolution, a link to this 
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their employees have authorization to work.206 Using I-9 forms, 
employers ask their workers to submit documents such as their 
passport or Social Security number as evidence of employment 
authorization.207 Employers may also voluntarily participate in 
E-Verify, which is an internet-based program that allows those 
who use it to compare documents submitted to employers 
through the I-9 process with information available with DHS.208 
In the event of an ICE raid, employees and unions have asked 
employers to demand to see a warrant before they may turn over 
any of their employees’ documents.209  
Other unions have also provided workshops and trainings 
for their members regarding what to do when there is a raid.210 
Indeed, some unions are pushing employers to contact them in 
case of a raid so that the unions can inform their employees.211 
Lastly, the foregoing workplace protective measures, grounded 
on private property and Fourth Amendment rights, have not 
been limited in the restaurant industry. As explained above, 
multi-billion dollar companies like Microsoft have also promised 
to offer protections for their workers, particularly after the Pres-
ident rescinded DACA.212 Of course, it is not quite clear what 
this statement means, given that it would be unlawful under fed-
eral law to employ an unauthorized worker.213 
 
source was found on the Teamsters website at This Week’s Teamster News for 
June 24-30, TEAMSTERS (June 30, 2017), https://teamster.org/blog/2017/06/ 
weeks-teamster-news-june-24-30. 
 206. Information for Employers and Employees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IM-
MIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/information 
-employers-employees/information-employers-and-employees (last visited Nov. 
11, 2017) (stating that employers must verify an individual’s authorization to 
work). 
 207. Form I-9 Acceptable Documents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/acceptable-documents/list-documents/form-i 
-9-acceptable-documents (last updated June 18, 2018) (listing that passports es-
tablish identity and employment authorization, whereas Social Security cards 
or numbers only establish employment authorization). 
 208. Verifying New & Existing Employees on Form I-9, E-VERIFY, https:// 
www.uscis.gov/e-verify/federal-contractors/verifying-new-existing-employees 
-form-i-9 (last updated Apr. 10, 2018) (“Employees must have a Social Security 
number (SSN) to be verified using E-Verify.”). 
 209. Bacon, supra note 62.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Haselton, supra note 15. 
 213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012) (prohibiting employers from knowingly hir-
ing undocumented workers). 
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In sum, like campuses, workplaces have emerged as sanctu-
ary sites that seek to not only create welcoming environments 
for immigrants but also pose challenges to the federal govern-
ment’s immigration enforcement actions. That is, regardless of 
the intent of public and private actors, these sanctuary campus 
and sanctuary workplace policies, as we have discussed, present 
obstacles to ICE and other law enforcement officers. 
3. Rapid Response Networks 
An increasing number of individuals and organizations in 
communities are pooling their resources to help immigrants who 
may be subject to or are undergoing raids. Many communities 
are creating networks—known as “rapid response networks”—
that dispatch assistance to individuals that are subject to en-
forcement raids. For example, the San Diego Rapid Response 
Network, which is a collaboration between the ACLU of San Di-
ego and Imperial Counties, San Diego Organizing Project, Em-
ployee Rights Center, and others, provides a twenty-four-hour 
hotline that anyone subject to a raid can call for help.214 The ser-
vice dispatches volunteers to collect information about the raid, 
fill out incident forms for legal aid, and direct individuals to so-
cial and mental health support.215 Additional rapid response net-
works have been established in San Francisco,216 Los Angeles,217 
and Santa Clara County, California.218 These organizations offer 
“sanctuary” by showing up at an immigrant’s dwelling during a 
raid and documenting the raids and arrests.219 Thus, exercising 
their First Amendment rights, these advocates recognize that 
they may not be able to stop the arrests, but they can help the 
immigrants by documenting the ICE agents’ behaviors. 
 
 214. Lisa Deaderick, For ACLU Executive Director, Immigrant Rights Are 
Civil Rights, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2018), http://www 
.sandiegouniontribune.com/lifestyle/people/sd-me-one-chavezpeterson 
-20180119-story.html. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Rapid Response Networks, READY CAL., http://ready-california.org/ 
print-resources/rapid-response-networks (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 217. Id.  
 218. Rapid Response Network in Santa Clara County, PACT, https://www 
.pactsj.org/santa-clara-county-rapid-response-network (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
 219. See Deaderick, supra note 214. 
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Other advocates involved with these rapid response net-
works offer legal assistance by finding lawyers who could repre-
sent the detained noncitizen.220 Similarly, the New Sanctuary 
Coalition of New York City is comprised of local “congregations, 
organizations, and individuals” that provide advocacy and sup-
port for immigrants.221 Members of the coalition also accompany 
individuals before immigration court proceedings and at ICE 
check-ins.222 
4. Social Network and Technology Sanctuaries 
One clear example of how sanctuary has multiplied is 
demonstrated in the use of technology to inform immigrants 
about potential ICE raids. One developer created a service, 
called RedadAlertas (Raid Alerts), which sends text messages to 
subscribers to warn them that a raid is taking place near their 
location.223 Similar to the driving application Waze, which ena-
bles drivers and passengers to send information about traffic 
patterns and warn others about the presence of police cars on 
the road and highways,224 this application offers news that 
would enable immigrants and their families to learn about law 
enforcement activity in their neighborhoods.225 Importantly, 
such activity—openly warning about the presence of law enforce-
ment officers—is lawfully protected activity.226 
 
 220. See id. 
 221. About Us, NEW SANCTUARY COALITION N.Y.C., http://www 
.newsanctuarynyc.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 222. Accompaniment Program, NEW SANCTUARY COALITION N.Y.C., http:// 
www.newsanctuarynyc.org/accompaniment-program-2 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
 223. Charlie Sorrel, This App Warns Undocumented Immigrants When 
Raids Are Coming, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.fastcompany 
.com/3068357/this-app-warns-undocumented-immigrants-when-raids-are 
-coming. Another developer created Notifica, an application that sends private 
notifications to one’s selected contacts in case they are detained in an ICE raid. 
See Issie Lapowksy, A Portable Panic Button for Immigrants Swept Up in Raids, 
WIRED (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/portable-panic-button 
-immigrants-swept-raids. 
 224. See Main Page, WAZE, https://www.waze.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) 
(describing Waze as “the world’s largest community-based traffic and naviga-
tion app”). 
 225. See Sorrel, supra note 223. 
 226. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; cf. Elli v. City of Ellisville, 997 F. Supp. 2d 
980, 983–84 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (ordering a preliminary injunction to stop the El-
lisville police from detaining and citing drivers that warn other drivers of on-
coming speed traps). But see United States v. Bucher, 375 F. 3d 929, 930, 934 
(9th Cir. 2004) (affirming an interference conviction for a man that warned an-
other that a national park ranger was about to arrest him, but noting that some 
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Others have created groups on Facebook to regularly share 
the location of immigration checkpoints and arrests227 while 
other individuals have used their own Facebook228 or Twitter229 
accounts to notify immigrants about potential raids. Sending no-
tices through social networks in order to help immigrants avoid 
raids and potential detention is arguably a protected act under 
the First Amendment.230 In Packingham v. North Carolina, the 
Supreme Court struck down a North Carolina statute that 
banned convicted sex offenders from using social networks.231 A 
person’s decision to send notices about immigrant raids through 
social networks is a plausible extension of rights protected in 
Packingham.232 
III.  SANCTUARY NETWORKS   
While Part II of this Article details the variety and legal 
boundaries of the individual types of sanctuaries, Part III tries 
to understand them in context. In this Part, we argue that a new 
framework is necessary to address the multiple and expanded 
sources of sanctuary that we previously discussed. In particular, 
 
“reasonable human conduct” surrounding conduct of officials may be permissi-
ble); Eugene Volokh, Warning Lawbreaking Friends and Family That the Police 
Are Watching Might Indeed Be Illegal, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 
5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/ 
05/warning-lawbreaking-friends-and-family-that-the-police-are-watching 
-might-indeed-be-illegal/?utm_term=.8f5b8fdeb22f (“[T]here’s no general legal 
right to warn people that the police are coming . . . and it may well be a crime 
(such as obstruction of justice or interfering with law enforcement).”). For a gen-
eral discussion of “crime-facilitating speech,” which may include warning others 
about police, see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1095 (2005). 
 227. Jacob Steinblatt & Ethan Harfenist, Facebook Groups Warn Immi-
grants About ICE Raids, Checkpoints, VOCATIV (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www 
.vocativ.com/404788/facebook-groups-warn-immigrants-ice-raids/index.html. 
 228. See Louisa Moller, State Rep. Defends Facebook Post Warning Immi-
grants of Rumored ICE Raids, CBS BOS. (Mar. 28, 2017), http://boston.cbslocal 
.com/2017/03/28/state-rep-facebook-post-warning-immigrants-rumored-ice 
-raids. 
 229. Audrey McNamara, Social Media Reports of an ICE Raid on Alcatraz 
Avenue Prove False, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.dailycal 
.org/2017/11/17/social-media-reports-ice-raid-prove-false. 
 230. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737–38 (2017) (hold-
ing that bans on social media, even those imposed on convicted sex offenders, 
violate the First Amendment). 
 231. See id. 
 232. Of course, one’s use of social network platforms can be regulated by the 
networks themselves, which could limit the ability of an individual to engage in 
advocacy through social media. See, e.g., Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https:// 
www.facebook.com/terms.php (last updated Apr. 19, 2018). 
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we introduce “sanctuary networks” as a conceptual framework 
to emphasize the power of networks comprised of both state and 
non-state actors to meaningfully influence policy areas.233 
The power that these myriad sanctuaries assert as govern-
ment agencies, religious institutions, school and university cam-
puses, and private groups showcases the decentralized and dis-
tributed nature of immigration enforcement. As stakeholders in 
the project of immigration regulation, the sanctuary policies gen-
erated by these varied institutions function as negotiations and 
contestations with the federal government’s current enforce-
ment regime. The ubiquity and multi-institutional nature of our 
reimagined sanctuaries provides opportunities for networked re-
sponses to federal programs and for thinking about longer-term 
processes of defining immigration policy. 
A. NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN IMMIGRATION 
Emerging theories of governance argue that descriptively, 
governmental entities—and especially a single level of govern-
ment—do not hold a monopoly over the regulation of a subject 
area, or the proliferation of the social norms that govern that 
field. Instead, several types of actors, ranging from legislatures, 
government agencies, corporations, foundations, non-govern-
mental organizations, and other more informal associations, ex-
ercise authority over particular fields in loosely connected net-
works.234 In essence, network governance theory suggests that 
governance has morphed into this decentralized distributed sys-
tem primarily because social and regulatory systems have be-
come highly complex and interdependent, with statutory frame-
works and enforcement schemes incorporating multiple 
 
 233. See generally Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Dis-
ciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
Changes in Governance] (analyzing various governance theories to provide a 
guide for rational and fair social change); Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 
30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005) [hereinafter Nodal Governance] (examining 
two case studies wherein governmental and non-governmental actors worked 
together to effect significant policy changes); Rhodes, supra note 26 (reviewing 
British governance theories to conclude that policy networks are especially ef-
fective in advanced industrial societies). 
 234. See Changes in Governance, supra note 233, at 12–19; Nodal Govern-
ance, supra note 233, at 31; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in 
Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, in Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 
232–34 (2005) (arguing that legal scholars and economists are biased towards 
state actors and have paid inadequate attention to the role of other market par-
ticipants in social ordering and norm-creation). 
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agencies, levels of government, and even private actors.235 The 
upshot of this theory of governance is that traditionally unher-
alded and ignored institutions and groups have the potential to 
influence policy and change social norms by exercising authority 
over their area of control or their constituents, and coordinating 
that exercise with others who might control other aspects of the 
regulatory space.236 
Immigration enforcement, in particular, appears to fit 
snugly into this theoretical framework. The federal immigration 
enforcement scheme already enmeshes multiple levels of govern-
ment, as state crimes and local prosecutions become the basis for 
immigration consequences.237 And, local law enforcement and 
government agency cooperation in the form of information ex-
change and facilities-usage has become critical to actualizing 
federal enforcement possibilities.238 Finally, in many instances, 
the federal government itself has created the conditions for ex-
tensive public and private institutional involvement in federal 
 
 235. See generally Changes in Governance, supra note 233 (discussing the 
emergence and development of network governance theory). 
 236. Id. at 20 (stating that non-commercial non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are able to influence governance “through their capacity to mobilize and 
shape public opinion through the publication of reports and access to the world’s 
media”); Nodal Governance, supra note 233, at 39 (discussing the ability of 
nodes to influence each other generally). 
 237. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, § 435, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(2012)) (expanding the list of deportable crimes to include any crime for which 
a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed); Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 350, 110 Stat. 
3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227) (making domestic violence 
and other state crimes a basis for deportation); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing 
Sex, Policing Immigrants: What Crimmigration’s Past Can Tell Us About Its 
Present and Its Future, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 149, 151 n.3 (2016) (discussing the 
“dramatic expansion of the immigration consequences of crimes, the increasing 
criminalization of immigration law violations, the growing use of immigration 
detention and other harsh enforcement techniques, and the growing involve-
ment of state and local police in enforcing federal immigration laws”). 
 238. Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and Its Con-
stitutional Dangers, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 227, 234–35 (2014) (dis-
cussing how local communities facilitate immigration enforcement by sharing 
information and by detaining and transferring individuals); see also, e.g., David 
Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 157, 220 (2012) (noting the popularity of the Secure Communities 
program, a program which automatically forwards local arrestee information to 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 
  
1254 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1209 
 
immigration enforcement.239 For instance, federal law specifi-
cally incorporates private parties’ and non-governmental insti-
tutions’ participation in particular aspects of immigration regu-
lation, such as employment prohibitions and refugee 
resettlement.240 In other situations, the federal government’s 
need for information or lack of familiarity with on-the-ground 
circumstances makes institutions like universities potentially 
valuable enforcement partners.241 Moreover even if particular 
institutions and groups are not explicitly contemplated in the 
background legal framework, federal officials’ anger with—and 
proposed crackdowns on—the sanctuary policies of such institu-
tions strongly suggest that those policies have real effect on the 
popularity, efficacy, speed, or cost of federal immigration en-
forcement.242 
Of course, places of worship or universities (whether public 
or private) or community organizations do not typically admin-
ister federal programs,243 and are not institutions in which all 
attendees might participate or elect leaders. While these private 
organizations are not the typical places where citizens might en-
gage the democratic process or participate in democratic institu-
tions, it is clear that community residents are using those insti-
tutions to articulate dissenting views on immigration. In a real 
 
 239. See generally Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Work-
place, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009) (discussing the outsourcing of workplace 
enforcement of unauthorized work to private employers through the I-9 system). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See, e.g., Emily Van Hoffman, Does ICE Pressure Schools for Student 
Info?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2016/04/does-ice-pressure-schools-for-student-info/477600. 
 242. See, e.g., UNM Sanctuary Campus: Resources and Info for the Effort to 
Make UNM a Sanctuary Campus, UNM SANCTUARY CAMPUS, http://www 
.unmsanctuarycampus.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (cataloging university 
members’ efforts to protest federal immigration enforcement). 
 243. One notable exception in the immigration field is refugee resettlement. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2012). In that area, the Office of Refugee Resettlement and 
State Department rely on the participation of several NGOs, even religiously-
based ones, to aid in resettling refugees in the United States. These NGOs are 
funded by the U.S. government for that purpose, and their relationship to the 
federal government is statutorily enshrined. Id. § 1522(a)(4) (granting funds di-
rectly to agencies which can “best perform the services” and denying states the 
right to review or approve both the decision to grant funds along with the terms 
associated therewith); see also Nayla Rush, ‘Private’ Refugee Resettlement Agen-
cies Mostly Funded by the Government, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://cis.org/Rush/Private-Refugee-Resettlement-Agencies-Mostly-Funded 
-Government (listing nine NGOs receiving resettlement funds). Without their 
help, the federal government currently has no governmentally-run resettlement 
process that works in the actual communities where refugees might be sent. 
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and practical sense, noncitizens, their proxies, and interested 
citizens can exercise voice and control in local institutions and 
groups that heed their input as residents, constituents, or stake-
holders, regardless of immigration status. 
Given this explicit or implicit incorporation into the immi-
gration enforcement regime, it is apparent that a variety of pub-
lic and private actors possess the opportunity to leverage their 
sphere of influence over the unlawfully present population who 
might inhabit, use, depend upon, or be members of, each of those 
atomized institutions and groups. By serving as physical shelter 
and protection, disseminating vital information, asserting con-
stitutional rights on behalf of immigrants, and using media to 
present competing visions of the rule of law and human interest, 
these institutions too, are points of governance, with some au-
thority over, and responsibility for, the relevant population.244 
The implicit interdependence between, and incorporation of, 
these myriad institutions involved in immigration enforcement 
facilitates our goal in the remainder of Part III: to illustrate the 
potency of these variegated nodes of immigration governance. In 
Section B, we argue that the robustness of the protection and 
integration available in a community to a vulnerable noncitizen 
is based on the strength of the network of sanctuary sites within 
that community. Undoubtedly, our claim about the robustness of 
a sanctuary network leaves open the possibility the nodes in the 
enforcement system might reinforce and amplify federal goals. 
Indeed, such is the case in states or municipalities that have 
taken decidedly anti-sanctuary stances. In such instances, local 
agencies’ and private organizations’ immigrant-protective poli-
cies become more isolated and exert comparatively less influence 
over the governance network. Yet, in Section C, we argue that 
these dissenting or isolated sanctuaries remain important actors 
in a system of distributed, nodal governance, despite their ina-
bility to compliment and coordinate with reinforcing state or lo-
cal governmental policies. 
B. COLLABORATIVE SANCTUARY 
Based on our mapping exercise in Part II, our most basic 
point is that the impact and effectiveness of sanctuary policies is 
 
 244. Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and 
the New ‘Denizens’, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 400, 406–08 (2003) (using the concept of 
“denizen” to capture the idea of those who may not possess membership in the 
nation-state, but are nevertheless subject to the governance of several state and 
non-state actors in a given regulatory domain). 
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invariably contextual. Even when cities or large law enforcement 
agencies conspicuously refuse to cooperate with federal authori-
ties, however, their ability to protect noncitizens within their ju-
risdiction is limited. Ultimately, to fully actualize the notion of a 
protective community, law-enforcement noncooperation policies 
must be paired with other government agencies, and non-gov-
ernmental efforts to provide sanctuary to noncitizens. This net-
worked effect of several nodes in a system working together pro-
duces a geographic area in which immigration enforcement 
policy in practice can be markedly different than that which the 
federal administration seeks to achieve. 
Clearly, not all parts of a governance system have the same 
power or influence, and some parts may have more coercive tools 
than the others.245 Our federalist system of dual sovereigns per-
mits the federal government to use its agents to enforce federal 
law, even when those actions occur in states and localities un-
friendly to such actions.246 But, the fact that the federal govern-
ment may override sanctuary policies through punitive federal 
laws, criminal sanctions, or defunding threats, does not diminish 
our argument that multiple institutions are participating in—
and sometimes controlling—immigration enforcement. More to 
the point, our fundamental premise here operates in the shadow 
of the reality that no individual sanctuary policy is foolproof, but 
that working in conjunction, these sites of governance might am-
plify their overall effect to achieve something close to a viable, 
alternate immigration policy. 
Even a robust citywide sanctuary can, at most, limit the 
city’s role in enforcement.247 Therefore, other forms of sanctuary 
are critical to maximizing the level of protection and inclusion 
offered to undocumented persons and their families. Indeed, the 
primary, unintended benefit of state and local noncooperation 
policies might be the ability of such a governmental policy to be-
get complementary responses from special purpose institutions 
and non-governmental organizations. If those institutions and 
organizations know their sanctuary practices—for example, in-
sisting on judicial warrants before cooperating with ICE 
agents—would reflect local government positions, it might make 
it more likely that such institutions conspicuously articulate 
 
 245. See infra Part III.C. 
 246. See generally John Kincaid, The Eclipse of Dual Federalism by One-Way 
Cooperative Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1061 (2017).  
 247. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173 (2012); Sanctuary City Ordinance, 
supra note 67. 
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their policies. Thus, the city or police department noncooperation 
policy might have cascading effects, even if the attitude of such 
local officials has no legal bearing on an institution’s ability to 
maintain or articulate such a standard. 
This dynamic might also work in reverse, with multiple in-
stitutions in a jurisdiction emboldening local officials to act sim-
ilarly. Recently passed laws in California provide ready exam-
ples of this reciprocal relationship.248 As discussed supra, the 
California Values Act limits state and local officials from cooper-
ating with and aiding federal immigration officials.249 The law 
expressly includes state university systems, reflecting the vocal 
and firm stance of students and administrators at those institu-
tions.250 When passed, A.B. 450, the Immigrant Worker Protec-
tion Act, prohibited any employers within the state from allow-
ing immigration authorities access to nonpublic areas of the 
business, or to employee records without a judicial warrant or 
subpoena, and required employers to give notice to their employ-
ees of ICE audits that check for unauthorized employment.251 
Although A.B. 450 has since been enjoined, it should be noted 
that prior to this statewide policy, business associations, individ-
ual employers, and labor unions as pockets of private employers 
within the state had already adopted aspects of this policy.252 As 
such, A.B. 450 represents one of the few instances of a govern-
mental sanctuary policy that regulates private actors and oper-
ates outside of the law enforcement context, and a prime exam-
ple of the dynamic relationship between private actors and state 
authorities in sanctuary policymaking.253 
 
 248. See supra Part II.B. 
 249. S.B. 54, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 7282–7284.12 (West 2018)). 
 250. Id. 
 251. A.B. 450, ch. 492, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3723 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 7285.1–.3 (West 2017) and CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 90.2 and 1019.2 (West 2017)). 
Note, however, that the provision of A.B. 450 prohibiting employers from con-
senting to ICE searches without a judicial warrant has been preliminary en-
joined by a district court on the basis that it likely violates the intergovernmen-
tal immunities doctrine. See generally United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 
3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018). 
 252. See, e.g., Sanctuary Restaurants, supra note 197. 
 253. The bill was proposed in direct response to the threat of increased im-
migration raids at workplaces under the Trump Administration. Press Release, 
David Chiu, Assemblymember, As Trump Ramps Up Action to Rip Immigrant 
Families Apart, Asm. Chiu, SEIU, and California Labor Federation Gives Work-
ers New Protections Against Worksite Raids (Mar. 24, 2017), https://a17.asmdc 
.org/press-releases/trump-ramps-action-rip-immigrant-families-apart-asm 
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Actualizing these reciprocal knock-on effects is crucial to the 
project of network governance that seeks to recalibrate the fed-
eral immigration enforcement regime. To more fully insulate 
vulnerable noncitizens from federal hyper-enforcement, sanctu-
ary must extend into as many of the physical spaces and associ-
ations noncitizens inhabit on a regular basis. It is in this space 
where school districts, universities and colleges, places of wor-
ship, workplaces, and individual networks might fill in the gaps 
for large swathes of the undocumented population who may not 
themselves be the object of law enforcement activity. Taken to-
gether, they raise the cost and stakes of federal enforcement ef-
forts within a jurisdiction to a degree that might be untenable, 
rendering immigration enforcement in that jurisdiction effec-
tively dictated by the policy vision of this decentralized and dis-
tributed band of governors. 
Several communities in California provide ready examples 
of the potential of this nested and loosely connected sanctuary 
system.254 At the state level, California policy attempts to reduce 
the state’s role in aiding federal immigration authorities to a sig-
nificant extent.255 Sentences for certain state crimes have been 
modified to avoid triggering immediate immigration conse-
quences.256 The state’s TRUST Act enacted in 2013 establishes a 
statewide minimum for the types of detainer requests to which 
any law enforcement agency within the state can respond.257 
Combined with the recent implementation of the California Val-
ues Act, these policies mitigate the aid that state and local law 
enforcement or agencies might provide to the federal govern-
ment. In doing so, they serve an important role in reducing the 
 
-chiu-seiu-and-california-labor. The California Labor Federation and SEIU Cal-
ifornia co-sponsored the bill, and organizations such as the California Immi-
grant Policy Center, United Farm Workers, and Worksafe supported the bill. 
Employment Regulation: Immigration Worksite Enforcement Actions: Hearing 
on A.B. 450 Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Indus. Relations, 2017–2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. 8–9 (Cal. 2017). 
 254. See, e.g., Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 67. 
 255. S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282–
7284.12 (West 2018)). 
 256. Press Release, Sen. Ricardo Lara, Lara Bill Will Retroactively Correct 
Discrepancy in Federal and State Misdemeanor Sentencing Laws (Mar. 30, 
2016), http://sd33.senate.ca.gov/news/2016-03-30-lara-bill-will-retroactively 
-correct-discrepancy-federal-and-state-misdemeanor. The statutory provision is 
codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 18.5 (West 2017). 
 257. See A.B. 4, § 2, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4650 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 7282.5) (stating that the individual must have been convicted of a misde-
meanor or felony). 
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chances of any individual within that community becoming the 
target of indiscriminate federal removal operations. 
Despite the importance of these statewide policies in articu-
lating a statewide norm and providing a floor for enforcement 
efforts, much of the sanctuary provided by the state could be un-
done or severely compromised by local policies and community 
practices that aid amplify or facilitate federal enforcement 
within specific localities and counties. Importantly then, the 
TRUST Act allows discretion for localities to create their own 
detainer response restrictions that are narrower than the 
statewide standards.258 Counties such as San Francisco and 
Santa Clara have done just that, articulating even broader de-
tainer-resistance ordinances as part of their respective sanctu-
ary laws.259 In addition, several counties in the state—including 
the immigrant-heavy municipalities of San Francisco, Santa 
Clara, Los Angeles, and Alameda—include other noncooperation 
policies such as “don’t ask, don’t tell” protocols for their law en-
forcement officers.260 These local efforts complement the 
statewide effort, doubling the legal constraints that local law of-
ficers and officials might face when deciding whether to cooper-
ate with federal enforcement efforts. 
Of course, a critical limitation on many of these state and 
local efforts is that their impact is necessarily limited to those 
who come into contact with law enforcement agencies as ar-
restees, witnesses, and victims. By definition, they cannot 
change the prospects for the large majority of noncitizens who 
may never come into contact with law enforcement officers as 
part of a criminal investigation, or in the official course of law 
enforcement activity. Moreover, it is possible that this type of 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12H.1–.6 (2016); Santa Clara County, Cal., 
Res. No. 2011-504 (Oct. 18. 2011), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/santa_clara_ordinance.pdf. 
 260. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2(c)–(d); ALAMEDA CTY. SHER-
IFF ’S OFFICE, GEN. ORDER NO. 1.24, ICE ENFORCEMENT, ARRESTS, DETENTION, 
REMOVAL, AND REQUEST FOR NOTIFICATIONS 1 (2015) http://www.ac-
gov.org/board/bos_calendar/documents/DocsAgendaReg_9_10_15/PUBLIC 
%20PROTECTION/Regular%20Calendar/ACSO%20General%20Order%201 
%2024_ICE%20enforcement%20arrests%20removal.pdf (“The Alameda County 
Sheriff ’s Office will equally enforce laws and serve the public without consider-
ation of immigration status.”); Robert Salonga, ‘Not Our Role’: Santa Clara 
County Cops Reaffirm They Won’t Be Deportation Force, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 
14, 2017), https://mercurynews.com/2017/03/14/santa-clara-county-law 
-enforcement-reaffirms-immigrant-protections (quoting Santa Clara County 
District Attorney Jeff Rosen that “[j]ustice does not ask victims for their immi-
gration papers, and neither do we”). 
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resistance might be overcome through federal conditional spend-
ing policies that induce local conscription into immigration en-
forcement.261 
Enter the network of local institutions and private actors in 
the sanctuary network. A particularly immigrant-friendly Cali-
fornia jurisdiction like Santa Clara County may have several 
forms of sanctuary nesting within it. The county’s detainer policy 
reinforces the TRUST Act and the California Values Act, utiliz-
ing local discretion to make both more muscular than the 
statewide standard.262 In addition, the county is home to school 
districts for primary and secondary education, as well as state 
and private higher education campuses. Several of these units 
have enacted sanctuary policies, either by express adoption of 
the term, or in action and policy that mirror sanctuary protec-
tions without utilizing the specific label.263 For many of the stu-
dents who may never come into contact with law enforcement, 
campus provides an additional haven during their daily lives. 
Private institutions, like Santa Clara University, can provide 
even stronger assurance of noncooperation, by maximizing their 
control over the private property that comprises its campus. 
Beyond vulnerable noncitizen students, the county is also 
home to one of the largest immigrant labor forces in the nation, 
ranging from high tech Silicon Valley workers to agricultural, 
restaurant, and construction workforces.264 As discussed supra, 
some employers have taken sanctuary-like stances by assuring 
their employees—consistent with their constitutional and prop-
erty rights—that they will respond to information, record, or 
 
 261. Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and 
the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 120 (2016) (ex-
ploring Congress’s conditional spending powers). 
 262. See Mercury News Editorial Bd., Editorial, ‘Sanctuary’ and Public 
Safety Can Be Compatible, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www 
.mercurynews.com/2017/03/20/editorial-sanctuary-and-public-safety-can-be 
-compatible-goals (quoting Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeff Rosen, 
who stated that “maintaining trust between residents and police ‘can be a mat-
ter of life and death’ in solving and preventing crime”). 
 263. See, e.g., San José Unified Sch. Dist., Res. 2017-02-09-01 (Cal. 
2017), https://web.sjusd.org/docs/board_education/Resolution-Supporting 
-Immigrant-Students-and-Families-ENG.pdf (resolving to aid immigrant fami-
lies and impede immigration enforcement, without labeling district as a sanc-
tuary); Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist., Res. 16-46 (Cal. 2016) (creating “safe 
zones” for students and their families threatened with immigration enforce-
ment, rather than sanctuaries). 
 264. Economy at a Glance: San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara, CA, U.S. BU-
REAU LAB. STAT. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ca_sanjose_ 
msa.htm. 
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search requests only pursuant to subpoenas, warrants, or court 
orders.265 An employer from Michigan recently illustrated the 
power of this simple and lawful insistence on proper documenta-
tion. Amidst a slew of immigration raids in the area, one Ann 
Arbor restaurant refused entry to ICE agents.266 As ICE rou-
tinely solicits enforcement aid without such court-issued docu-
ments,267 even a momentary refusal can provide significant no-
tice to noncitizens affiliated with the employer. 
Beyond schools and workplaces, networks of private individ-
uals and religious organizations have promised physical and 
emotional sanctuary to noncitizens within the community. In the 
wake of federal enforcement efforts, private individuals and net-
works of private individuals have devised systems to protect 
their fellow community members.268 Informal groups can pre-
pare with text alert systems to advise of any raids or enforce-
ment efforts.269 Going one step further, Los Angeles is home to 
several private homeowners who have made known that their 
homes could be used for shelter and protection.270 
Finally, places of worship in the area have announced that 
they would harbor members of their congregation seeking refuge 
from enforcement.271 In doing so, they join the nationwide group 
of religious institutions that have opted to shelter those who 
might be the target of enforcement actions. Although they are 
not immune from criminal or other laws of general applicability, 
 
 265. See, e.g., Sabatini, supra note 197 . Notably, employers have taken crit-
ical positions against President Trump’s E.O. 13,780, often refered to as the 
“Muslim-ban,” which we believe helps to promote an inclusionary environment 
in the workplace. See, e.g., Matt Drange, Facebook, Google, Apple Lead U.S. 
Business Charge Against Trump Travel Ban, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2017), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/mattdrange/2017/02/03/silicon-valley-giants-joins-forces 
-again-to-oppose-donald-trumps-immigration-orders/#3a2b8c7a20c4. 
 266. Haynes, supra note 14. 
 267. Without Warrants, Immigration Agents Often Pose as Police Officers, 
NPR (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/21/516488396/without 
-warrants-immigration-agents-often-pose-as-police-officers. 
 268. Morrissey, supra note 9. 
 269. Sorrel, supra note 223. 
 270. Lah et al., supra note 129. 
 271. Devin Fehely, San Jose Catholic Churches May Serve as Sanctuaries 
for Immigrants Under Trump, CBS S.F. (Jan. 10, 2017), http://sanfrancisco 
.cbslocal.com/2017/01/10/san-jose-catholic-churches-may-serve-as-sanctuaries 
-for-immigrants-under-trump; Tatiana Sanchez, In Trump Era, Bay Area 
Churches Offer Sanctuary to Undocumented Immigrants, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 
17, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/02/05/in-trump-era-bay-area 
-churches-offer-sanctuary-to-undocumented-immigrants. 
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the special status of religion in the American constitutional or-
der imbues their resistance with legal and moral heft.272 Moreo-
ver, by openly declaring their intentions and providing shelter, 
they offer a competing interpretation of federal law: one in-
tended not as an act of civil disobedience, but rather as fidelity 
to, in their view, a more compassionate and just interpretation 
of the law than the one offered by federal authorities.273 In addi-
tion, in some areas, the “church” has become a movable point of 
resistance untethered from a particular physical location.274 The 
“Sanctuary in the Street” movement brings congregation mem-
bers to enforcement loci, challenging enforcement agents to 
physically bypass them in order to effectuate removal.275 
Given these multiple sanctuary institutions and sites, it is 
unlikely that an undocumented individual living in these Cali-
fornia communities would be a target for local law enforcement 
actions solely based on immigration status. If they did come into 
contact with law enforcement, it is unlikely in many cases that 
their immigration status would be advertised to federal author-
ities, or that local authorities would facilitate their transfer to 
federal custody. Meanwhile, that person would be able to obtain 
a driver’s license and move about freely, and while in the com-
munity might find some measure of insulation in their (or their 
family’s) educational institution or workplace.276 In the event of 
an ICE raid, they might be able to receive advance warning 
through informal information-sharing networks, and could 
likely access advocacy organizations and religious institutions 
 
 272. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429–30 (1962) (“The First Amend-
ment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the 
power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, 
support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say—that the 
people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for 
change each time a new political administration is elected to office.”). 
 273. See Bezdek, supra note 104, at 912–15 (discussing how sanctuary par-
ticipants engage in a normative process to interpret immigration law based on 
conceptions of morality). 
 274. See Harry Bruinius, New Twist for Deportation Opponents: Sanctuary 
in the Streets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.csmonitor 
.com/USA/Politics/2017/0317/New-twist-for-deportation-opponents-sanctuary 
-in-the-streets. 
 275. Id. 
 276. A.B. 60, ch. 524, 2013 Cal. Stat 4307 (codified at CAL. VEH. CODE 
§ 12801.9 (West 2017)) (requiring the California Department of Motor Vehicles 
to issue an original driver’s license to a person unable to prove lawful presence 
in the United States if he or she satisfies all other qualifications). 
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that would be willing to provide them legal defense and physical 
shelter.277 
Undoubtedly, this web of overlapping and multi-faceted 
sanctuary sites exists in its most robust form in select few places, 
where public and private institutions exercise their authority in 
like-minded ways. But even in such places, maximal benefits 
and efficiencies are gained only through coordinated activity 
within the network.278 Thus, the next step in more effective im-
migration governance in places with multiple forms of sanctuary 
is coordination between private and public institutions. The lev-
eraged power of these variegated sights has potential to counter 
the significant governance authority and coercive force of the 
federal immigration regime. 
While some cities and states have created offices for immi-
grant integration and the like,279 it is not clear how much coor-
dination they facilitate between sanctuary providers. Moreover, 
coordination might be difficult in the case of sanctuaries, where 
institutions and agencies might have extremely varied reasons 
for their policies. Some law enforcement agencies may be wary 
of the “pro-immigrant” bent of sanctuary policies, preferring to 
justify their stances on the use of local resources or federalism 
principles.280 Some universities and employers might similarly 
be concerned about federal response and couch their resistance 
in more general policies with regards to information-sharing and 
 
 277. For a small glimpse of the practical effect of these enmeshed protective 
networks, see Tatiana Sanchez, Santa Clara University Students Walk Out in 
Solidarity with Undocumented Immigrants, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://mercurynews.com/2016/11/17/santa-clara-university-students-walk-out 
-in-solidarity-with-undocumented-immigrants (discussing rally held at Santa 
Clara University, a Jesuit private university, calling for sanctuary policy). 
 278. J. Kenneth Benson, The Interorganizational Network as a Political 
Economy, 20 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 235–36 (1975) (arguing that interorganiza-
tional networks are equilibrated when work coordinated between multiple or-
ganizations is “geared into each other with a maximum of effectiveness and ef-
ficiency”). 
 279. MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., USC CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF IMMIGRANT INTE-
GRATION, OPENING MINDS, OPENING, DOORS, OPENING COMMUNITIES: CITIES 
LEADING FOR IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION 5, http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/ 
731/docs/USC_ASCOA_WelcomingUSC_Report_WEB.PDF (stating that there 
were at least twenty-six cities with integration offices in 2015). 
 280. See, e.g., Tom Jackman, Police Chiefs’ Immigration Task Force Outlines 
Opposition to Trump Policy, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/03/01/police-chiefs-immigration 
-task-force-outlines-opposition-to-trump-policy/?utm_term=.f2658a19630b (de-
scribing the police chiefs’ letter as being opposed to heightened immigration pol-
icies because they “can best serve [their] communities by leaving the enforce-
ment of immigration laws to the federal government”). 
  
1264 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1209 
 
access. As such, some of the institutions and organizations com-
prising the overlapping and complementary sanctuaries might 
resist any formalized coordination and association with other 
sanctuary sites. 
Currently there are incipient signs of cooperation and coor-
dination in some places. In Denver, church officials worked with 
elected officials to help secure relief for an undocumented immi-
grant.281 New York City’s 2017 budget created a public-private 
partnership so that undocumented immigrants could receive le-
gal defense against removal prosecutions.282 Similar cooperation 
between non-profits, educational institutions, and government 
officials is taking place in Connecticut.283 These instances pro-
vide models for greater coordination among governance points in 
the immigration enforcement network, amplifying the ability to 
control resources, share information, and overcome restraints 
that might constrain any one, isolated institution. 
Our prescription, based in network governance theory, for 
like-minded jurisdictions and organizations, is to mimic the 
types of policies implemented by the public and private institu-
tions in places like California and New York City, and increase 
the level of coordination between these variegated points of gov-
ernance. By doing so, those with governance authority over im-
migration in immigrant-protective jurisdictions can collaborate 
to recalibrate an enforcement regime that, in their view, is un-
just. 
 
 281. See Melissa Etehad, Denver Mother Is Granted Temporary Deportation 
Relief After Three Months of Sanctuary in a Church, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-na-denver-mother-relief-20170512 
-story.html (reporting on an undocumented woman who received a stay of re-
moval after seeking sanctuary in a Denver church). 
 282. Liz Robbins & J. David Goodman, De Blasio and Council Agree, and 
Disagree, on Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/06/06/nyregion/de-blasio-and-council-agree-and-disagree-on-immigrants 
.html (discussing that the city has earmarked funds for undocumented immi-
grant representation since 2013 despite internal debate on which immigrants 
will be eligible to receive support). 
 283. Mary O’Leary, Undocumented Immigrant Who Took Sanctuary in Con-
necticut Church Granted Stay of Deportation, REG. CITIZEN (July 26, 2017), 
http://www.registercitizen.com/general-news/20170726/undocumented 
-immigrant-who-took-sanctuary-in-connecticut-church-granted-stay-of 
-deportation (showing coordination and support between Connecticut Governor 
Dannel P. Malloy, Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman, and United States Sen-
ator Richard Blumenthal in the case of an undocumented mother). 
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C. DISSENTING SANCTUARY 
Section B, above, argues that a broader conception of gov-
ernance over immigration enforcement might help explain how 
networks of private and public actors can effectively and lawfully 
collaborate to resist federal immigration prerogatives. But, one 
of the consequences of distributed and decentralized governance 
networks is that the central government’s position might be 
strengthened just as much as it might be opposed. It is possible, 
given unified political party control or capture by policy activists, 
that expanding the loci of immigration enforcement governance 
might mean echoing and amplifying the federal enforcement re-
gime. 
The ability of a decentralized governance regime to amplify 
the federal government’s enforcement power is evident in the 
states, counties, and educational systems adopting decidedly 
“anti-sanctuary” stances. Texas, Mississippi, and the Georgia 
higher education system provide ready examples.284 Texas’s 
S.B. 4 is an omnibus anti-sanctuary law that virtually compels 
local law enforcement agencies and localities to comply with fed-
eral immigration enforcement programs. It forces local agencies 
to comply with ICE detainer requests under threat of criminal 
and financial penalties, as well as loss of office.285 And, the law 
includes campuses and campus safety officers in addition to po-
lice departments.286 Similarly, bills in Mississippi and Georgia 
have targeted sanctuary policies, and specifically sanctuary 
campuses. Although those states’ policies are more vaguely 
worded than Texas’s, both attempt to crack down on the ability 
of post-secondary institutions to adopt sanctuary policies.287 
Georgia’s S.B. 37, enacted in response to movements at Emory 
University and other Georgia colleges to adopt formal sanctuary 
policies, directly targets private institutions.288 It threatens 
them with loss of state funding if they declare themselves sanc-
 
 284. H.B. 37, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Ga. 2017); S.B. 2710, 2017 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017); S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). 
 285. Tex. S.B. 4. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Ga. H.B. 37; Miss. S.B. 2710.  
 288. Jeremy Redmon, Georgia Lawmaker Seeks to Ban “Sanctuary Policies” 
at Private Colleges, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/ 
news/state—regional-govt—politics/georgia-lawmaker-seeks-ban-sanctuary 
-policies-private-colleges/7cH6bAVO2q6nw9n08ArzJI. 
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tuaries and adopt policies that materially interfere with commu-
nication or investigation about immigration status with federal 
authorities.289 
Returning to our theoretical framework of networked gov-
ernance, in these jurisdictions, two major players in the net-
work—the federal government and the state legislature or 
agency—have used the levers under their control to tamp down 
on oppositional policy expressions at the local and hyper-local 
level. Moreover, as the two sovereign entities in the regulatory 
field, they possess monopolistic control over both hard law and 
the hard sanctions that come with it, including use of force and 
criminal liability. In addition, because state governments are not 
constrained by the same federalism limits as the federal govern-
ment, their policies fill in the constitutional gaps where federal 
regulation may not be able to reach, complementing federal en-
forcement prerogatives and providing more complete regulatory 
control.290 Unlike the federal government, state governments are 
not constrained by limitations on congressional authority to leg-
islate, the Tenth Amendment, or other federalism limitations 
and, therefore, their ability to control local governments, agen-
cies, and private actors is more robust and complete.291 
These methods of coercion and norm-instantiation are un-
doubtedly powerful and, initially, are likely to influence behavior 
and attitudes in ways that other institutions in those networks 
might find difficult to match or counteract. In the wake of legal 
uncertainty about the consequences of their noncooperation or 
anti-detainer policies, public officials might simply err on the 
side of supporting enforcement-heavy policies. This seemed to be 
the case last year with Miami-Dade County, after President 
Trump issued his executive orders on interior enforcement.292 
Or, sheriffs, county officers, and public university administra-
tors who previously were undecided or silent on the issue, might 
 
 289. Ga. H.B. 37.  
 290. These ideas are explored in greater detail in a forthcoming article, Anti-
Sanctuary: A Turn Towards Immigration Localism, by the co-authors of this 
paper and Professor Rick Su. Gulasekaram, Su & Villazor, supra note 25. 
 291. See generally KENNETH R. THOMAS, FEDERALISM, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION: BASIS AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30315.pdf (detailing the legislative power differ-
ence between state governments and the federal government). 
 292. See Kurtis Lee, Miami-Dade County Mayor Heeds Trump’s Call, Effec-
tively Ending ‘Sanctuary’ Status, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.latimes 
.com/politics/washington/la-na-trailguide-updates-miami-dade-mayor-heeds-
donald-trump-s-1485482985-htmlstory.html (stating that he did not want to 
jeopardize the “millions of funds” the city gets from the federal government). 
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be emboldened and incentivized to take enforcement-heavy 
stances, given the support and encouragement from their state 
and federal counterparts and party officials. And, private organ-
izations might seek to use their authority to help implement the 
federal enforcement plan, as recently evidenced by the alleged 
actions of at least some locations of Motel 6, a Texas-based com-
pany, in providing information about their guests to immigration 
officials.293 
As such, these anti-sanctuary jurisdictions illustrate the in-
escapable reality that distributed governance with multiple 
stakeholders neither means equal distribution of power, nor use 
of that power in opposition to the central governing authority.294 
Yet, just because nonfederal, non-state stakeholder institutions 
in jurisdictions like Texas do not have the same resources or co-
ercive levers as the federal and state governments, does not 
mean they lack all power. Indeed, the very point of decentralized 
governance over immigration enforcement of a myriad of actors 
is that power over the regulatory field is diffused, to varying de-
grees, to many actors. Thus, even if only relatively less well-re-
sourced and powerful institutions and organizations are left to 
instantiate certain policies, those “dissenting sanctuaries” will-
ing to either bear the cost of federal and state sanctions or will-
ing to voice loud disagreement with the federal and state policy 
decision can still affect the stability of the dominant policy out-
come over time. 
An example of such a sanctuary site in a network is Travis 
County, Texas. The county is home to Austin, the relatively lib-
eral-leaning state capital in a state that is overwhelmingly 
red.295 There, the elected sheriff instituted a policy of noncooper-
ation with ICE.296 Although Sheriff Hernandez’s policy had some 
local support,297 it garnered immediate backlash at the state 
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Hernandez’s ICE Policy, TRAVIS CTY. DEMOCRATIC PARTY (Feb. 17, 2017), 
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level. Soon after the policy was instituted, the state’s governor 
denounced her actions, and then withheld $1.5 million in state 
grant funds from the county.298 A few months later, with the gov-
ernor’s resounding approval, the legislature passed S.B. 4, the 
state “anti-sanctuary” law.299 The sheriff ’s office initially main-
tained its noncooperation policy despite losing significant state 
funding and serving as the rhetorical punching bag for the 
state’s governor and federal officials.300 However, the sheriff ’s 
office ultimately agreed to comply with the law after the relevant 
sections of Texas S.B. 4 were declared to be constitutional.301 It 
is not surprising that Sheriff Hernandez would back down from 
her prior policies considering the substantial risk of monetary 
and criminal liability now facing noncomplying local entities and 
their officials. 
Consistent with our general theoretical approach, we sug-
gest that such situations counsel for a greater understanding 
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and encouragement of distributed governance networks, not 
less. The importance of non-governmental and private sanctuar-
ies in recalibrating immigration policy becomes relatively more 
important. As an example, in Travis County, a community of im-
migrant advocates have initiated the Austin Sanctuary Network 
(ASN).302 ASN is a loose coalition of religious institutions, un-
ions, non-profit organizations, and individuals who oppose the 
federal government’s enforcement policies within Travis 
County.303 Within the last year, ASN has grown from just a few 
churches to more than two-dozen multi-faith congregations.304 
Although billed as a “religious organization” on Facebook,305 me-
dia reports suggest that ASN includes three labor unions and 
several non-profit groups as well.306 This array of non-govern-
mental organizations, loosely coordinated and connected both by 
their shared policy outlook and the populations they serve, are 
among the only sanctuary sites remaining when municipal dis-
sent is quashed. 
More generally, in anti-sanctuary states, the long-term goal 
of the multitude of municipal and non-governmental institutions 
in the network might be different than that of similar institu-
tions in places like the Bay Area or New York City. Ultimately, 
municipal agency positions like Sheriff Hernandez’s, or the work 
of ASN, raise the political and enforcement costs for the other 
sites of governance in their geographic network. The sheriff ’s re-
luctance to withdraw her noncooperation policy forced the gov-
ernor, in a highly publicized move, to withhold state funds,307 
and then prompted the legislature to enact a law with sanctions 
applicable to every municipality within the state.308 And, the 
State of Texas has been forced to defend that policy in federal 
court against a lawsuit brought by multiple Texan cities and lo-
cal officials who oppose the statewide policy.309 Thus, while these 
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state-level actions have the potential to stifle local dissent, they 
also necessitate the expenditure of political capital, and require 
the state to use its prosecutorial and legal apparatuses to ensure 
compliance. 
Meanwhile, even if the state is willing to expend its re-
sources to force municipal agencies to get it in line with its gov-
ernance objectives, the other nodes in the immigration network 
can still raise the long-term political costs to state officials by 
using “soft” powers to undermine the moral and legal legitimacy 
of the state’s hard approach. Aside from the practical effect for 
the noncitizens in their midst, the organizations in ASN also 
serve the critical governance functions of norm-creation and 
swaying public perception. Indeed, even though federal and state 
authorities were successful in eradicating the Austin Sheriff De-
partment’s noncooperation policy, these religious organizations, 
non-profit groups, and labor unions still retain the power to mo-
bilize local and national media, in essence standing in for, and 
reaffirming, the municipality’s voice on immigration enforce-
ment. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while dissenting sanctuaries 
might be isolated within their state or municipality, they are not 
alone. Descriptively, a geography or region-centered account 
may not accurately portray how sub-federal immigration policy 
actually emerges in the first place.310 More broadly, it chafes 
against the reality that in the past few years, much immigration 
federalism—including decisions to litigate against federal pre-
rogatives—are done through trans-state and trans-local collabo-
rations that transcend state boundaries. On the sanctuary front, 
there appears to be emerging a trans-local network of religious 
and non-profit organizations banded in common cause.311 In this 
regard, consider the example of Jesuit universities. In response 
to expected federal enforcement efforts, it was the Association of 
Jesuit Colleges and Universities, with campuses across the coun-
 
(providing an overview of S.B. 4 and the preceding litigation over its constitu-
tionality). 
 310. See generally GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24, at 75–
105, 207–10 (showing through quantitative and qualitative empirical data that 
demographic factors and region-specific concerns do not explain the rise of sub-
federal immigration laws, and that partisanship, entrepreneurship, and politi-
cal factors are salient). 
 311. Ruth McCambridge, Sanctuary Network Rooted in Religious Tradition 
Reblossoms Nationwide, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 27, 2017), https:// 
nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/03/27/sanctuary-network-nationwide-charity. 
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try issuing a joint statement about the commitment of those uni-
versities to undocumented students.312 Their commonality was 
not their geographic region or the particular demographic 
makeup of their campuses; rather it was their shared institu-
tional mission and ideological focus.313 
In short, institutional and even governmental positions on 
immigration are just as, if not more, likely to track party affilia-
tion and ideology more than they do jurisdictional lines and re-
gion-specific policy challenges. Thus, even the dissenting sanc-
tuary is likely not as isolated as it might appear; although it may 
be disconnected from the state in which it is located, it is in con-
versation with like-minded localities across the country, and 
non-governmental institutions in its own backyard. 
Here we have argued that the effect of any sanctuary varies 
depending on context. This leads to our final and related point 
in Part IV: Every stakeholder institution, whether governmen-
tal, religious, private, or informal, participates in setting the ac-
tual level of immigration enforcement, leading to a decentral-
ized, multi-jurisdictional, multi-institutional negotiation of 
national immigration policy. 
IV.  NETWORKED SANCTUARIES AND NATIONAL 
IMMIGRATION POLICY   
Immigration remains one of the most divisive and conten-
tious topics on the national agenda. It has significantly shaped 
the past four presidential contests,314 and has played a leading, 
if not decisive, role in several midterm elections for federal law-
makers.315 Yet, despite all this national attention and rhetorical 
 
 312. Press Release, Presidents of the Ass’n of Jesuit Colls. & Univs., State-
ment of AJCU Presidents on Undocumented Students (Nov. 30, 2016), http:// 
www.ajcunet.edu/press-releases-blog/2016/11/30/statement-of-ajcu-presidents 
-november-2016. 
 313. See id. (discussing the common mission of the Association to “embrace 
the entire human family, regardless of their immigration status”). 
 314. ASIAN AM. JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., BEHIND THE NUMBERS: POST-ELECTION 
SURVEY OF ASIAN AMERICAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER VOTERS IN 2012, at 8–9 
(2013), http://www.apiavote.org/sites/apiavote/files/2012research/btn_final_ 
singles_FINAL_0.pdf (ranking the importance of issues to Asian American vot-
ers in the 2012 presidential election); GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra 
note 24, at 90–111; Thomas B. Edsall, The Democrat’s Immigration Problem, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/opinion/the 
-democrats-immigration-problem.html (noting the salience of immigration atti-
tudes and policy positions in the 2016 election). 
 315. GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24, at 90–111; see also, 
e.g., Aaron Blake, Make No Mistake: Immigration Reform Hurt Eric Cantor, 
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focus by lawmakers, there have been no major comprehensive 
changes to federal immigration law for over two decades. In-
stead, the major changes in immigration enforcement policy 
have been achieved through modifying enforcement practices, 
with the federal executive deploying resources and altering ad-
ministrative agency directives to achieve a hyper-enforcement 
regime.316 
The federal government, and in some cases, state govern-
ments, command massive resources and maintain a monopoly on 
coercive force and hard law. But, as we have argued, they are not 
the only institutions that deal with the on-the-ground realities 
of the communities they serve, or who have chosen to take 
stances in the national debate on immigration. The story we tell 
about the variegated sites and sources of sanctuary expands our 
understanding of who actually governs and defines immigration 
enforcement policy. This decentralized and distributed govern-
ance network over immigration enforcement has long-term prac-
tical, political, and theoretical implications. 
Here, we suggest three ways in which sanctuaries are mold-
ing the national agenda on immigration, changing the terms of 
national immigration policy, and nudging us towards more nu-
anced understandings of governance and legal doctrine in immi-
gration enforcement. These changes, we argue, are for the better. 
As a prescriptive matter, this Article concludes by suggesting 
that in immigration enforcement, the proliferation of multiple 
forms of sanctuary across a distributed and decentralized net-
work of actors is a useful and desirable trend for democratizing 
immigration enforcement. In adopting the sanctuary label or im-
plementing immigrant-protective policies, these public and pri-
vate entities transform themselves into important political ac-
tors, leveraging the real power they possess as nodes of 
governance over immigration enforcement. 
 
WASH. POST (June 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/ 
2014/06/11/yes-immigration-reform-hurt-eric-cantor/?utm_term= 
.3371bb414493 (discussing the role that House Majority Leader, Eric Cantor’s, 
support for immigration reform had in his 2014 loss to Dave Brat); Seung Min 
Kim, The Race Where Immigration Matters, POLITICO (May 6, 2014), http:// 
www.politico.com/story/2014/05/house-race-immigration-106372 (discussing a 
House of Representatives race in North Carolina where the incumbent GOP 
member was attacked by opponents for her belief in legalizing all immigrants 
that were in the United States illegally). 
 316. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799–800 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
(directing executive agencies to increase their enforcement of immigration laws 
through all legal means). 
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A. DIMINISHING THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
First, focusing attention on local government agencies and 
non-governmental institutions and organizations recalibrates 
the position of the federal government in immigration enforce-
ment. The potential for governance from a multitude of sanctu-
aries helps us get beyond sovereignty as the sole focus of sanctu-
ary debates. The use of sanctuary policies at the local level, and 
into local institutions, functions in many ways, as Dean Heather 
Gerken suggests, as “federalism all the way down.”317 In her con-
ception, too much attention has been focused on sovereignty as 
the source of interactions and friction in our federalist system of 
government. Relatively too little academic focus has centered on 
institutions and agencies devoid of sovereignty, where dissent-
ing views can be expressed and instantiated.318 As per her frame-
work, getting beyond sovereignty allows for reconceiving the re-
lationship between the national government and loci where 
people might participate in government and policymaking.319 
Gerken’s discussion is mostly limited to the role of special pur-
pose public institutions—school districts, juries, zoning commis-
sions, and the like—and their importance in federalism.320 Our 
discussion of sanctuaries incorporates those sites of potential re-
sistance, but also includes private institutions and organiza-
tions. 
Accordingly, for our purposes, the main takeaway from 
Gerken’s framework is that resistance and dissent to federal pol-
icies might benefit from de-emphasizing sovereignty and sepa-
rateness from the federal government. In immigration, it is clear 
that sovereignty can be a double-edged sword. Relying on a ro-
bust version of state sovereignty to shield state and local sanc-
tuary policies from attack might reify the importance of sover-
eignty generally;321 the same thick notions that form the basis of 
the plenary power doctrine and unconstrained federal power 
over immigration.322 And, muscular state sovereignty argu-
ments might help justify state anti-sanctuary laws or other 
 
 317. See generally Gerken, supra note 28 (proposing a form of democracy in 
which local institutions are given more autonomy to govern themselves, thereby 
increasing the say that minority groups have in governance). 
 318. Id. at 8, 24–33. 
 319. Id. at 8. 
 320. Id. at 26–28 (labeling such institutions as special purpose institutions).  
 321. See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Ex-
ceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 638–39 (2017). 
 322. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012) (“The Govern-
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heavy-handed state-level enforcement schemes.323 For those ar-
ticulating minority or dissenting positions then, it may very well 
pay off in the long run to consider non-governmental forms of 
resistance to federal policies and enforcement programs. This is 
especially true if one believes that long-term changes in atti-
tudes and policies towards immigrants are more likely to gain 
steam at the local and institutional level, rather than at 
statehouses and the White House. 
Most sanctuaries—but especially those without sovereign 
status, like municipalities, universities, school districts, and pri-
vate organizations—have no real “exit” from federal laws and 
schemes.324 Thus, their resistance is always a direct challenge to 
the legitimacy and value of the current Administration’s immi-
gration enforcement plan, rather than a claim about separate 
policymaking spheres. As such, it packs more normative heft 
than claiming that a jurisdiction is exempt from federal policies 
and control. Together then, these distributed sanctuary inputs 
move us beyond the hard dividing lines of sovereignty, and refo-
cus the debate on the role that each of these private and public 
agencies and institutions might play in immigration enforce-
ment through control over their private property or their soft 
power over norm-proliferation and consumer attitudes. 
Of course, it remains true that at least some of the legal ba-
sis for certain types of sanctuaries—like churches and others 
 
ment of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of im-
migration and the status of aliens.”); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing 
the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, and federal power over for-
eign affairs as sources of plenary authority); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
62–63 (1941) (citing the Supremacy Clause as justification for the federal gov-
ernment’s power over immigration law). 
 323. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402–03, 410 (arguing that Arizona could im-
plement criminal sanctions for immigration law violations because it furthered 
federal goals, and that the state could arrest individuals with probable cause 
that he or she committed a removable offense); Defendants’ Response to Appli-
cations for Preliminary Injunction at 29–39, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. 
Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. SA-17-CV-404-OLG) (arguing that the State 
of Texas can enforce immigration law in collaboration with the federal govern-
ment); see also Gulasekaram, Su & Villazor supra note 25 (documenting the rise 
in federal and state anti-sanctuary laws). 
 324. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RE-
SPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4, 15–20 (1970) 
(describing “exit” as a choice made by consumers to stop buying a business’s 
products, and discussing the impracticability of the option to exit from the po-
litical world in comparison with the option to voice one’s dissatisfaction); see 
also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 32, at 1259 (“To borrow from Albert 
Hirschman, uncooperative federalism values a state’s voice options over its exit 
options.”). 
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whose claim is based on their control over a particular space—
depends on the ability to control and protect a physical area out-
side the reach of federal interference. Even without sovereignty 
then, these sanctuaries are in essence asking for a realm of sep-
arate and autonomous control. The difference between such 
claims and those made by states and cities asserting sovereignty, 
however, is that ultimately, federal and state power can likely 
reach into and influence those non-governmental spheres 
through legislation or by fulfilling legal and procedural require-
ments in their enforcement actions. As such, while certain non-
governmental sanctuaries also rely on ideas of separate and au-
tonomous space, much of their ability to actually operationalize 
and maintain that autonomy must still be achieved through ne-
gotiation and norm-proliferation. 
By de-emphasizing or eliminating a sovereignty-based fo-
cus, organizations, institutions, and local governmental actors 
might seek to change and influence federal policymaking with-
out having to rely solely on constitutional allocations of power 
and domains of authority. Sovereignty and federalism principles 
play almost no role in the legal defense of local institutions nor 
in the private forms of sanctuary that we have identified. In-
stead, common law and statutory protections, as well as individ-
ual liberties found in the Constitution, play a much larger role. 
What mostly links these multi-faceted sanctuaries—from states 
to localities and agencies to schools and churches—is not their 
claim to be the final decision maker over a jurisdiction, but ra-
ther that all of them are registering dissent against the current 
federal administration’s immigration policy. 
B. IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATIVE POLICY EXAMPLES 
Second, and relatedly, by enacting or articulating laws, pol-
icies, standards, or mission statements, these public and private 
sanctuaries are instantiating an alternative policy vision to the 
federal vision. To paraphrase Hiroshi Motomura’s formulation, 
the norm in areas of overlapping sanctuaries is that unlawful 
status is the beginning of the conversation, not the end.325 By 
changing the starting point of the conversation, places with sev-
eral private and public sanctuary policies in place can anchor 
and frame the national policy debate in ways that more abstract 
legislative debate amongst federal lawmakers alone cannot. 
 
 325. See MOTOMURA, supra note 31, at 31. 
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This anchoring effect occurs in two ways. As an initial mat-
ter they allow a greater population of people, including the un-
documented, to register their voice in the larger national immi-
gration policy debate through participation in a variety of 
organizations and memberships. By actually articulating a sanc-
tuary policy—by “dissenting by deciding” in Gerken’s formula-
tion326—these multiple points of sanctuary allow their specific 
constituencies, as well as broader local, state, and national ones, 
to weigh competing conceptions of rule of law, moral legitimacy, 
public safety outcomes, and social justice embodied by the ad-
ministration’s approach in contrast with the sanctuaries’ ap-
proach. In short, they allow national debates about immigration 
policy to be accessed in the institutions of everyday life, where 
the real-world effects of those policies will have immediate reso-
nance. 
Relatedly, by instantiating policies, both the members of the 
implementing jurisdiction, organization, or institution and those 
in other parts of the country can measure the effects of the policy. 
The existence of sanctuary jurisdictions has allowed researchers 
to test the public safety rationale proffered by the current ad-
ministration for its attempted crackdown on such policies.327 
These analysts conclude that the existence of sanctuary policies 
do not create more criminality or more dangerous communities; 
indeed, their research confirms just the opposite.328 And, unlike 
other situations in which a local policy might result in the ex-
 
 326. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 32, at 1293–94 (discussing the 
value of allowing state and local governments to experiment with policy for-
mations that differ from the federal government’s); see also Gerken, supra note 
32, at 1759–98 (differentiating decisional dissent from conventional dissent and 
describing how decisional dissent can give minorities more power to participate 
in governance). 
 327. See generally TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & NAT’L IMMIGRA-
TION LAW CTR., THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE 
ECONOMY (2017), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Effects 
-Sanctuary-Policies-Crime-and-Economy-2017-01-26.pdf (finding that sanctu-
ary counties have lower crime rates and stronger economies than nonsanctuary 
counties); Benjamin Gonzalez et al., The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, 
Crime, and Undocumented Immigration, URB. AFF. REV. ONLINEFIRST, May 7, 
2017, at 1, 12–34 (testing the claim that sanctuary cities are associated with an 
increase in crime rates and finding no statistically meaningful increase associ-
ated with sanctuary policies). 
 328. See WONG, supra note 327, at 1 (finding that communities with sanctu-
ary policies have lower rates of crime and unemployment compared to commu-
nities that do not); Gonzalez et al., supra note 327, at 24 (finding that sanctuary 
policies have no discernible impact on local crime rates). 
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porting of externalities to other places, a sanctuary policy, if an-
ything, should import those burdens to the enacting jurisdic-
tion.329 Yet, apart from isolated and tragic instances, sanctuary 
jurisdictions still remain amongst the safest places in the coun-
try. 
To be clear, our argument does not rely on this particular 
empirical result. Adamantly, our position is not that sanctuary 
jurisdictions are necessarily safer than those that cooperate with 
federal policies. While that result comports with our perspective 
on the normative value of sanctuaries, our broader claim is only 
that these implemented policies provide a real-time comparison 
along the criteria which the public and public officials might 
evaluate competing policy visions. 
C. REVEALING THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Third, reconceptualizing sanctuaries as emergent from var-
ious public and private spaces allows a broader and more accu-
rate rendering of the costs of overriding these types of policies. 
Of course, traditional sites of sanctuary already help calibrate 
enforcement costs. For example, because sovereignty-based de-
fenses aim to make sanctuary sites the final decision makers for 
their geographic area, it is no surprise that litigation over Pres-
ident Trump’s attempted crackdown on sanctuary cities has em-
phasized Tenth Amendment boundaries, relying heavily on 
cases like Printz v. United States.330 In response, Congress could 
simply bypass state and local resistance and enforce immigra-
tion law with federal agents, resources, and facilities; or it might 
 
 329. See Christopher Ingraham, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities Are Hotbeds 
of Crime. Data Say the Opposite., WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/27/trump-says-sanctuary-cities 
-are-hotbeds-of-crime-data-say-the-opposite/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.d1aabd2c9dfa; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s Claim 
That ‘Criminals Take Notice’ of Cities with Sanctuary Policies, WASH. POST 
(July 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017 
/07/17/attorney-general-jeff-sessionss-claim-that-criminals-take-notice-of-cities 
-with-sanctuary-policies/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4f9489accff3 (disputing 
Jeff Sessions’s claim that “criminals take notice” of sanctuary city policies and 
increase crime rates). 
 330. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20–21, 39, 
County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 
3:17-cv-00485); Amicus Brief of 34 Cities and Counties in Support of County of 
Santa Clara’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5–9, Santa Clara, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 1196 (No. 17-cv-00574-WHO); see also Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that, under the Tenth Amendment, the federal 
government may not force state officials to administer a federal program). 
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use conditional spending levers to bribe or cajole cooperation 
with federal authorities. 
Either way, the existence of the sanctuary site forces the 
federal government to internalize the costs of hyper-enforce-
ment. Direct federal enforcement requires the appropriation of 
funds for personnel and facilities. Meanwhile, monetary induce-
ments and financial coercion require the federal government to 
put another type of price tag on the value of state and local coop-
eration. Additionally, because those federal penalties are likely 
to affect other federal and state policy goals, the federal govern-
ment is, in some cases, forced to announce which policy goal it 
values more.331 For instance, this administration’s Department 
of Justice has responded to the existence of noncooperation poli-
cies by threatening to take away federal grants made to local law 
enforcement for training, facilities, personnel, and other forms 
of critical public safety support.332 In doing so, the administra-
tion has implicitly chosen to prioritize immigration enforcement 
over other community safety policy goals. 
In addition to laying bare the fiscal costs of federal enforce-
ment policies or forcing the federal government to internalize 
those costs, sanctuary sites also nudge the federal government 
to calculate the long-term political costs of hyper-enforcement 
policies. Perhaps the most important leverage that municipali-
ties have is the degree the federal government relies on their 
manpower, facilities, and information in immigration enforce-
ment.333 For public sanctuaries, whether or not sovereignty-
 
 331. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, At-
torney General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces 
-immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial (requiring 
state and city law enforcement to cooperate and comply with federal immigra-
tion law to receive funding for essential services, including corrections, law en-
forcement, and drug treatment); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BACK-
GROUNDER ON GRANT REQUIREMENTS (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press 
-release/file/984346/download (listing actions state and city authorities must 
follow). 
 332. See Sari Horwitz & Maria Sacchetti, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Re-
peats Trump Threat That ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Could Lose Justice Department 
Grants, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-repeats-trump-threat-that 
-sanctuary-cities-could-lose-justice-department-grants/2017/03/27/1fa38e2a 
-1315-11e7-9e4f-09aa75d3ec57_story.html?utm_term=.d1bccd0fd068. 
 333. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., HOW ICE USES LOCAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEMS TO FUNNEL PEOPLE INTO THE DETENTION AND DEPORTATION SYS-
TEM (2014), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/state-local 
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based arguments end up shielding their policies from federal 
commandeering, it is likely that both the federal government 
and the municipal ones would prefer a mutually agreed upon 
and noncontentious relationship. The more the federal govern-
ment forces local cooperation through mandates and commands, 
likely the more contentious and friction-filled that relationship 
will be in the long term. Because of the interconnectedness and 
integration required for immigration enforcement (and several 
other federal programs), the federal government risks losing 
over time by winning right now. 
In our recasting and expanding the landscape of sanctuary 
sites and sources, these points of interconnectedness multiply. 
Of course, the federal government does not rely on universities, 
school districts, or religious institutions for immigration enforce-
ment in the way it relies on local law enforcement agencies. But, 
if these institutions were wholly useless or meaningless in im-
migration enforcement efforts, then recent federal and state 
anti-sanctuary proposals and laws would be unlikely to cover 
them.334 Instead, those policies expressly contemplate the re-
sistance of places like universities and employers. 
As such, it remains plausible that a sufficiently motivated 
ICE official might attempt to leverage university administrators 
in the same way they would attempt to conscript local law en-
forcement officers.335 Even though universities might have some 
constitutional and statutory rights to resist such heavy-handed 
 
-enforcement-and-ice-2014-03-25.pdf; see also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional 
Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1380–81 (2006) (suggesting that the federal govern-
ment’s immigration enforcement policies are more effective if people believe “all 
police, teachers, and other local government employees will cooperate in immi-
gration enforcement”).  
 334. See, e.g., H.B. 37, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017) (barring private 
postsecondary institutions from adopting any sanctuary policies); S.B. 4, 85th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (prohibiting university campus police from prevent-
ing enforcement of immigration law by other officials); see also Bezdek, supra 
note 104, at 902–03, 947–48 (discussing that during the early times of church 
sanctuary, the federal government said they were irrelevant, only to later real-
ize their importance and prosecute them). 
 335. See Gabrielle Russon, Florida Colleges Take Middle Ground on Immi-
gration Battle, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.orlandosentinel 
.com/features/education/school-zone/os-campus-sanctuary-20170207-story 
.html (discussing how the federal government could respond to schools resisting 
immigration enforcement, including “strip[ping] schools of their right to issue I-
20 forms, documentation that international students need . . . to study in the 
United States”). 
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enforcement,336 it seems also likely that federal officials would 
in many instances be able to overcome that resistance. Yet, it is 
also true that the federal government uses universities to imple-
ment many federal policy objectives unrelated to immigration 
enforcement,337 which might counsel for a less antagonistic rela-
tionship over the long term, nudging the federal government to 
moderate its immigration enforcement priorities in service of 
those other federal goals. Now, with sanctuaries expanding into 
variegated institutions and sectors, across all states, any such 
federal override necessarily must overcome the expressed policy 
preference of high-profile institutions, places of worship, and 
powerful firms. It can no longer be a quiet or unnoticed exercise 
of federal power. 
In sum, we find the democratizing potential of expanding 
sanctuaries to be doctrinally, theoretically, and politically desir-
able. For purposes of this Article, we defend that prescription 
with regards to immigration enforcement, but recognize the pos-
sibility of decentralized and distributed governance networks in-
fluencing many regulatory regimes. We also caution—like any 
claim about democratized inputs—that such networks might be 
used by political forces from all parts of the spectrum. Applied to 
immigration, that means that distributed networks might accel-
erate hyper-enforcement agendas just as easily as they can mit-
igate them. Given the historical and current reality of the federal 
government’s enforcement policies, however, we predict that 
sanctuary networks are much more likely than anti-sanctuary 
networks. 
Fundamentally, our encouragement of the phenomenon is 
based on the effect that taking public stances on immigration 
enforcement is likely to have on public and private actors who 
take them. By adopting noncooperation policies, sanctuary insti-
tutions have cemented their identity as political actors in the im-
migration field. Incorporating their authority into debates over 
 
 336. See supra Part II (discussing property rights and FERPA). 
 337. See generally John E. Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More 
Must Be Expected—More Must Be Done, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143, 144–
45 (2009) (discussing federal interest in universities as research facilities); Fed-
eral & Industry Research Partnerships, U. COLO. BOULDER, http://www.colorado 
.edu/research/federal-industry-research-partnerships (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018) (providing a list of partnerships between the university and various fed-
eral agencies); US Federal Funder Public Access Policies, OFF. SCHOLARLY 
COMM., https://osc.universityofcalifornia.edu/scholarly-publishing/policies 
-legislation/us-federal-funder-public-access-policies (last updated Sept. 20, 
2017) (mentioning that the National Institutes of Health is the largest federal 
supporter of basic research). 
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the proper level of federal immigration enforcement helps these 
organizations actualize their own civic identities and untapped 
power within this network. This reorientation might prove to be 
important going forward in galvanizing proactive (as opposed to 
reactive) immigration enforcement policies, and producing col-
laborative and complementary ties among like-minded agencies 
and institutions. This reorientation is especially important in 
the immigration field, a field dominated by the view that the fed-
eral government has “sole” or “exclusive” control over immigra-
tion policy.338 
Looking to the future, the new sanctuary movement’s pri-
mary contributions to immigration politics might be its galvani-
zation of a fresh and engaged set of political actors on enforce-
ment policy. Some major players in the sanctuary movement, 
especially large, prominent jurisdictions like San Francisco and 
New York City, have long battled with the federal government 
over immigration enforcement and are likely to continue to do so 
into the future.339 Federal lawmakers representing those areas 
have been sensitive to these constituent interests.340 But now, as 
a diverse group of religious institutions are claiming to provide 
sanctuaries, a new crop of powerful community institutions has 
been galvanized.341 Some are the same denominations and 
 
 338. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604–07 (1889) (de-
scribing the powers of the federal government, one of which is the power to reg-
ulate the presence of individuals from foreign nations in the United States). 
 339. See S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 375–89 (1989) (amended and current ver-
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churches that provided sanctuary in the 1980s; others, however, 
are places of worship from other faiths, which cater to a variety 
of ethnicities and races not represented in that original sanctu-
ary push.342 The same can be said of groups of high-tech and so-
cial-media-oriented individuals who have created phone applica-
tions, and joined coding campaigns and enforcement-alert 
networks to warn of federal enforcement efforts.343 Indeed, res-
taurants and colleges that perhaps never thought they needed to 
be clear on where they stand on ICE enforcement have been 
forced, either by constituent request or by federal demands, to 
clarify their protective positions. 
These individuals and organizations are likely to see them-
selves as political actors, specifically on the issue of immigration 
enforcement, in a way that may not have occurred but for the 
expanded sanctuary movement. Joining the sanctuary move-
ment, even in ways that are mostly symbolic, reifies their civic 
identity in the eyes of those they serve and in those of federal 
and state officials who might oppose their stances. In the coming 
years, as federal officials seek funding for a border wall or 
greater enforcement resources, these groups are likely to main-
tain the vocal positions they assumed as part of the sanctuary 
movement. 
Thus, even if the federal government can leverage, coerce, 
bribe or otherwise override sanctuaries and compel participation 
in immigration enforcement, it might be doing so at the cost of 
further antagonizing a now-mobilized and entrenched constitu-
ency that shares a clearly defined ideological orientation on such 
actions. Any short-term wins for the federal administration on 
undermining sanctuary may galvanize a broader network of im-
migration governance and multiply potential resistance nodes to 
the federal government’s long-term enforcement plans. 
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  CONCLUSION   
This Article brings necessary attention to the variety of 
ways in which the label “sanctuary” has expanded. Going beyond 
the traditional categories of sanctuary cities, rooted in public 
law, and sanctuary churches, rooted in property law and free ex-
ercise rights, a myriad of institutions and organizations have 
chosen to adopt policies that mitigate federal enforcement ef-
forts. These new sanctuaries, in several jurisdictions, have the 
ability to work together in a network to effectively recalibrate 
federal enforcement and provide de facto governance over immi-
gration enforcement. More broadly, this distributed network de-
centers federal and state administrative officials, including the 
President, as the sole locus of enforcement policy. In addition, 
they bring to the fore the political power and governance author-
ity of several previously ignored institutions and actors. Thus 
reimagined, our project emboldens such institutions and associ-
ations as critical actors in the project of norm creation and actual 
governance, in ways that are likely to influence immigration pol-
icymaking both now and into the future. 
